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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS:
AN AUSTRIAN APPROACH
by Fiammetta Elena Zahnd
This thesis applies Austrian economic theory to envi­
ronmental goods. It emphasizes capital, interest and en­
trepreneurial satisfaction of consumer demand for environ­
mental goods. Although provision of several types of envi­
ronmental goods is mentioned, the final application is to 
groundwater resources.
Both capital and consumer environmental goods must be 
privately owned and freely exchanged to generate market 
prices that are used to determine whether capital is being 
maintained and whether production satisfies consumer demand. 
Political control wastes resources and causes conflicts. 
Prior appropriation is the best legal system for recognition 
of water property titles. Private ownership of water does 
not preclude cooperation. Private corporations could hire 
teams of hydrologists and engineers to manage aquifers for 
maximum shareholder value.
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CHAPTER I
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
Environmentalists may despise economic theory as an il­
legitimate and offensive technique for affixing monetary 
prices to invaluable environmental goods, yet environmental 
policy makers may welcome economic theory as a bastion of 
objectivity that can generate "bottom line" figures.
Environmentalists, people concerned about the quality 
and quantity of environmental goods, correctly sense that 
there may be something illegitimate about payment schemes 
devised by planners. Economics is the science of human ac­
tion, of human choice of goals and the means to achieve 
them. Freedom is necessary for choice. When action is co­
erced, prices are distorted. They no longer clearly reflect 
the subjective valuations of acting individuals. Economic 
theory explains the general distortions caused by coercion, 
but the underlying real data of the economy cannot be cor­
rectly ascertained when human action is coerced. Prices 
emerge as more complex or higher order human phenomena that 
are based on the more fundamental phenomena of human subjec­
tive valuation and voluntary exchange. Monetary amounts re­
quested under coercion as payment for environmental goods 
are not prices. Economic theory can say very little about
2
such requested payments except that they are arbitrary. 
Therefore, they cannot achieve the distribution of environ­
mental goods desired by individuals in the economy.
ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS
Although environmentalists have the correct hunch about 
arbitrary payment schemes, they may have overlooked how eco­
nomic theory can help them to provide environmental goods. 
Part of the motivation for the current environmental move­
ment is the recognition that many environmental amenities 
which were available in abundance have become scarce. Many 
people now purchase bottled purified water for drinking, and 
filters and ionizers to provide clean air to breathe in 
their homes. In Mexico City, vending machines supply clean 
air. Clean air and water near population centers are not 
free goods.
A good is an economic good if it is scarce. Scarcity 
means that not everyone who wants the good can have as much 
as he or she desires without giving up something else to get 
it. If a good is available in such a large supply that ev­
eryone who wants some of it can have as much as he or she 
desires, then the good is considered to be free by economic 
theory.
The distinguishing characteristic of an economic good 
is not that a consumer must pay money to acquire it. The 
notion of a free good is broader. A free good is a good
3
which is literally available for nothing, except the time 
one must give up to enjoy it rather than some other good.
If people must drive to the country to fill their lungs with 
clean air, then even though they do not deposit coins or 
bills in an air-dispensing machine to purchase the clean 
air, it is not a free good. The drive to the country con­
sumed gasoline and put wear and tear on the car. The trav­
elers had to give up other things they could have done in­
stead. As soon as one must give up anything to acquire a 
good, its character has changed from a free to a scarce eco­
nomic good.
The above analysis should reinforce the notion that 
economics is the science of human action, for an object that 
remains the same to the physicist or chemist has changed its 
nature to the economist. The object itself has not changed. 
There may be objectively less of it, but this is not alone 
what made it scarce. The necessary condition for scarcity 
is human desire. For if there were less of a good which no 
one wanted, it would not be considered scarce by economic 
theory, and if there were more of a good of which everyone 
wants more, it would still be considered scarce by economic 
theory. The key is human valuation.
Environmental goods are economic goods as long as they 
are the object of human valuation and not freely available 
to all who desire them. The goal of some environmentalists 
to provide environmental goods for free to all who desire
4
them, as a sort of human birthright, can therefore be seen 
to be impossible. The very fact that environmental goods 
have become the object of action by environmentalists re­
moves those goods from the category of free goods and places 
them in the category of economic goods which are not free. 
The action the environmentalists must take to attempt to 
provide the environmental goods are part of the cost of the 
good. No amount of political action can make an economic 
good free. This is true even if environmentalists establish 
a scheme which coerces some individuals to subsidize envi­
ronmental goods for other consumers. The environmentalists 
did not sit at home doing nothing while other humans sat at 
home enjoying environmental goods, as both groups know very 
well. Therefore, as nice as it would be if environmental 
goods were our birthright, they are in fact not free. 
Environmental goods are the object of human action. They 
are scarce. Environmental goods are economic goods.
Environmentalists, media journalists, politicians and 
others often refer to the environment as if it were a single 
indivisible good. Aspects of the environment are interre­
lated into what ecologists call the biosphere or ecosphere 
and geologists call the geosphere but acting human beings 
distinguish various aspects of the environment as separate 
goods. Some environmentalists may have as the goal of their 
action an overall clean environment. Yet, an 
environmentalist cannot make the entire earth clean in one
5
action. That final goal has many subcomponents that are 
goals of action. Environmentalists can instead take many 
separate actions directed toward subcomponents of the 
environment. Because economics is the science of human 
action, this study will treat the environment as acting 
humans value it: as a set of distinguishable environmental 
goods rather than one indivisible good.
Human valuation determines not only whether a good is a 
free good or an economic good, but also what type of eco­
nomic good it is. The same type of physical good can have 
different economic functions. The three theoretical divi­
sions of productive factors are land, labor, and capital. 
Clearly environmental goods are not labor but they may be 
classified as land. Environmental goods can be enjoyed as 
ends in themselves, or they can serve as means to another 
goal. In economic terms, environmental goods can also be 
both consumer and capital goods.
Environmental goods that exist as they occur in nature, 
without human transformation, fit the economic category of 
land. The economic category of land includes things such as 
natural resources that are originally provided in nature. 
Once human labor is mixed with land, and the land is put to 
productive use, it becomes more difficult to clearly distin­
guish whether the good is in the category of land or of cap­
ital. Poor topsoil improved through the addition of organic 
material and used to grow food, for example, is no longer in
6
the state in which it was found in nature. An old forest 
when first cut is land but with reseeding and careful har­
vesting it becomes capable of a sustained yield. The labor 
of reseeding, of planning timely harvests, of forest manage­
ment, all go into converting raw land into what might be 
more properly characterized as a capital good. The line is 
blurry. Clearly, the actual physical land dimensions are 
still land which can be sold or rented. Nevertheless, as 
humans convert more and more of the earth's surface and 
bring more resources into production, natural resources are 
no longer merely land. They become capital goods.
Consumer goods satisfy human desires directly, but they 
do not have to be destroyed to be enjoyed. Van Gogh's 
"Sunflowers" can be enjoyed by throngs of gallery visitors 
without being used up in the process. Similarly, a real 
landscape may provide visual pleasure without being de­
stroyed in the process. This latter good is an environmen­
tal good. Although the process of consumption does not 
destroy these goods, they are still scarce because they are 
not available unless one takes action to acquire them. One 
must drive to the landscape or live in it to enjoy it. Of 
course, many environmental goods do deteriorate through 
consumption. This is a particular problem for managers of 
wilderness. Restrictions on the enjoyment of wilderness 
such as visitor limits, camping permits, and waiting lists
7
illustrate the fact that these are indeed scarce, not free, 
goods.
Environmental goods serve not only as consumer goods to 
which we travel for recreation or health. Certain aspects 
of the environment take on the nature of capital goods, eco­
nomic goods which are used to produce directly enjoyable 
consumer goods. Water in a river might once have been used 
solely as a recreational consumer good, but now in conjunc­
tion with a dam may provide the hydroelectric power to pro­
duce the slide show rafters can share with their friends.
Environmental goods may be either capital or consumer 
goods, but the emphasis below will be on the investment of 
capital in the production of directly consumable environ­
mental goods. The image which one might have in mind as the 
quintessential environmental good is a pristine wilderness. 
It may therefore seem artificial to think of this as some­
thing produced. It is rather thought of as discovered or 
experienced. Further reflection, however, will reveal that 
one's experience is made possible by a multitude of auxil­
iary produced goods. Merchandisers of special outdoor 
clothing provide us with a measure of comfort while we are 
in the wilderness. Mosquito repellant keeps us from being 
driven to distraction. Topographic maps, compasses, and al­
timeters allow us to find our way into and out of the 
wilderness so that it is not the last good we consume. The 
services of guides or instructors may provide or teach us
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skills we need to survive in the wilderness. We may have 
prepared for the experience by reading books printed by 
presses in ink on paper. Photographic equipment allows us 
to partially recapture the experience when we are no longer 
in the wilderness This technology involves chemicals, and 
perhaps also electronics and electricity.
What we mean by wilderness as an environmental good is 
clearly not to walk barefoot with thorns and stones 
puncturing our feet, nude with the sun burning our skin or 
rain drenching us or snow and ice making us hypothermic, 
gathering herbs and berries and eating them cold, subject to 
mauling by large predatory animals or to intestinal disease 
from invisible bacteria in impure water. Although one can 
imagine that some people might want to experience utter 
wildness, clearly this is different from what we normally 
mean by wilderness as an environmental good. We must 
therefore accept the fact that production allows us to enjoy 
environmental goods.
Even those who desire utter wildness must have legiti­
mate ownership of the wilderness they tread. Perhaps they 
have established their discovery of fishing holes. Perhaps 
they have marked boundaries of the area which they roam. 
Perhaps they have made millions on Wall Street and bought a 
south sea isle. Perhaps they are allowed to roam the area 
in exchange for cataloguing species which interest nature 
society members not sufficiently enamored with wilderness to
9
put up with ticks and chills. Clearly, then, environmental 
goods exist within the nexus of all goods, property ex­
changes, and production.
PUBLIC GOODS
Some economists propose a third type of economic good 
in addition to consumer and capital goods, and environmen­
talists often seem to place the environment in this category 
of goods. This type of good is called a "public good."
The definition of a public good is problematic. Public 
goods are generally held to have two characteristics.
First, nonpayers cannot be excluded from enjoying them. 
Second, additional consumers enjoy the good at no additional 
cost to the provider. Private goods would have the opposite 
qualities.
One problem with this definition is that many goods 
which people would normally consider to be private have a 
public good aspect, such as privately landscaped yards and 
maintained homes. Nicely upkept private property tends to 
increase property values in the neighborhood. Neighbors 
also enjoy the beautiful landscape even though they do not 
pay to maintain it. Owners may use new technology to ex­
clude nonpayers, thereby converting a public to a private 
good. Fences block other people's view, for example. A 
second major problem with the definition is that costs are 
subjective, so that only the provider can determine whether
10
the costs of providing the good to an additional consumer 
are zero.
In addition to these problems of unambiguous classifi­
cation, thorough examination of the historical record indi­
cates that many goods now assumed to be public goods were 
privately provided in the past. Ronald Coase's research on 
lighthouses demonstrated that they were not the paradigmatic 
public good that economists often assume them to be (1974).
Despite the problems with the notion of a public good, 
the common assumption is that public goods must be publicly 
provided. The argument is that if there are free riders, a 
private supplier will not be willing to provide the good, 
and therefore government must do so. Those interested in 
the provision of environmental goods may subscribe to this 
view. Environmental goods such as clean air and water may 
seem to be public goods which must be publicly provided. 
Given the historical evidence and logical problems with the 
definition of a public good, the classification of 
environmental goods as public goods will not be further en­
tertained here. Rather, the remaining focus is to emphasize 
the private provision of environmental goods. The notion of 
a public good is unnecessary both for the theoretical out­
line of Austrian economic theory and for the application of 
that theory to environmental goods. For an examination of 
the concept of a "public good," see (Hoppe 1989b).
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Economic theory is as applicable to environmental goods 
as it is to any other scarce, valuable object of human ac­
tion. To the extent that humans choose environmental goods 
as goals, or use environmental goods as means to other 
goals, economic theory is applicable to environmental goods. 
Economic theory is a useful tool for understanding how 
environmental goods can be provided to those who desire 
them.
12
CHAPTER II
AUSTRIAN ECONOMIC THEORY
This section presents the essential principles of 
Austrian economic theory which will then be applied to the 
provision of environmental goods. Although there are cur­
rently few proponents of Austrian economics relative to more 
popular theories such as Keynesianism and monetarism, the 
popularity of a theory has no necessary positive correlation 
with its truth. At times in the history of economic 
thought, the precursors of Austrian economics were the 
mainstream. In the field of resource economics, Austrian 
theory has not diverged from its roots, but more mainstream 
theories have become encrusted with auxiliary notions such 
as public goods, externalities, and social cost-benefit 
analysis.
METHODOLOGY
Austrian economic theory provides a lean cut through 
the meat of the discipline, a chunk Ockham himself could 
have sliced off. Like the best cuts, it is high on nutri­
tion and low on fat. An Austrian approach to environmental 
economics recognizes that because economics is a social sci­
13
ence, its methodology is different from that of the physical 
sciences. Because of the implications of its explicit and 
highly refined methodology, Austrian economics can make a 
unique contribution to environmental economics, and it ar­
rives at its conclusions with a minimum of auxiliary con­
structions. It is, in a word, efficient.
Humans have no special insight into causal factors in 
the physical or biological sciences, and therefore must de­
velop and test causal explanatory principles from repeated 
observations. The methods of the physical sciences are in­
appropriate and unnecessary for investigations of human phe­
nomena because humans know through introspection the cause 
of human action. Investigations of human action are there­
fore fundamentally different from our studies of nonhuman 
events.
The method appropriate to the social sciences is deduc­
tion from the synthetic a priori statement, "humans act."
We cannot successfully doubt the statement, because to make 
the statement, "Humans do not act," is itself a human act. 
Thus, the fact of human action is indubitable for us. This 
is not a sterile fact. This statement implies a wealth of 
conclusions about human action in the world. Human action 
provides a synthetic a priori methodology: it yields 
information about the world yet is fundamentally true.
"Praxeology" is the term coined by the Austrian 
economist, Ludwig von Mises, to describe the body of knowl­
14
edge deduced from the fundamental axiom of human action. 
Every discipline must begin somewhere; the praxeological 
method begins with the self-evident proposition, "humans 
act." From this and some auxiliary assumptions which take 
into account the nature of our physical world and human 
nature as we know it, Austrian economics has reconstructed 
everything from marginal value theory to business cycle 
theory.
The conclusions of Austrian economics are derived from 
an indubitable axiom by means of logical inference. 
Therefore, empirical tests of economic theory are unneces­
sary. Reason is a sufficient tool for deduction. Austrian 
economics is accessible to all reasoning intellects. An 
Austrian approach to environmental economics is an applica­
tion of this deductive methodology. An Austrian approach to 
environmental economics, therefore, is deductive. Barring 
mistakes in logic, the conclusions of Austrian economic 
theory are undeniable.
Conclusions that have the character of undeniable laws 
should not be offensive to environmentalists. Environmental 
sciences are painstakingly empirical. Their laws are based 
on induction from observation. Though the methodologies of 
economics and the environmental sciences are different, both 
disciplines have scientific laws which cannot be violated 
with impunity. A certain number of fertile individuals must 
exist to maintain a species. If the number drops below
15
this, the species becomes extinct. Barring miracles of 
molecular genetics, no amount of intervention can revive the 
species. In economics, expansion of credit induces mal- 
investments which cannot be sustained by concurrent consumer 
savings. No amount of inflation (increases in the supply of 
money) can avert the down side of the business cycle, and in 
fact further extensions of credit or inflation worsens it. 
These are both scientific laws, though one is inductively 
and the other deductively discovered.
Humans have no special insight into the causal factors 
in the physical or biological sciences, and therefore must 
develop and test causal explanatory principles by repeated 
observation. This methodological difference between the 
social and physical sciences requires a methodological dual­
ism. It is inappropriate and unnecessary to use the methods 
of the physical sciences to investigate human phenomena. 
Ludwig von Mises emphasized these differences in several of 
his books (1966,1976,1978,1985).
The empiricist positivist paradigm of science denies 
the existence of synthetic a priori statements. Either a 
statement is undeniably true but devoid of any empirical in­
formation, or the statement is not undeniably true but pro­
vides such information. To the positivist, all statements 
in the human social sciences must be empirically testable, 
not undeniably true. Statements which pass tests are still 
not undeniably true, but are tentatively accepted. Hans-
16
Hermann Hoppe has provided a succinct statement of the dif­
ferences between the two positions and a refutation of the 
positivist approach to the science of human action (1983). 
The different method of the social sciences allows informa­
tion to be discovered through deduction. The implications 
of the axiom of human action are developed below.
IMPLICATIONS OF ACTION
The axiom of action is "Humans act." This means that 
we pursue ends different from what might occur if we did not 
act. If we expect to be satisfied by the result of our in­
action, we do not act overtly. This is also an act, how­
ever, because we choose to continue in the previous action. 
Our actions are motivated by our desire to achieve our cho­
sen ends. Economics cannot deduce the particular motiva­
tions for human action. That is properly the domain of 
psychology. Economics can say that humans act to achieve 
ends which they prefer, rather than ends which would occur 
if they did not act. We use the means at our disposal, ini­
tially our bodies but also any other means we have acquired, 
to achieve our goals.
Our ends have subjective value to us as individual ac­
tors. The fact that we pursue an end means that it is of 
value to us. "Subjective" as used here does not connote 
something untrue or less reliable than something objective. 
"Subjective" means simply "from the acting individual's per-
17
spective." Because ends are pursued by individuals, no 
other sense of value except the subjective exists in human 
action.
There are a wide range of ends which an individual can 
pursue but only a limited amount of means to achieve them. 
Even if physical means were abundant, as long as time passes 
and we have only one body, we can only pursue one end at a 
time. We must, therefore, rank our ends. This is not nec­
essarily an explicitly conscious process. What must be 
true, however, is that any given action aims at the highest 
ranked end at that time.
From the means at our disposal we use those which we 
expect will help us achieve our highest ranked end. Our 
means are ranked in value according to the ends we expect 
them to achieve.
Ranking may conjure notions of arithmetical comparison 
but it would be incorrect to attempt such an application. 
While ends and means may be ordered from most to least val­
ued, all that can be said about any two ends or means is 
that one is preferred to the other. We cannot say by how 
much one is preferred to the other. Value is subjective. 
There is no objective unit of value by which to compare 
ends. Ends are ordinally, not cardinally, ranked. If there 
is no cardinal ranking for an individual because there is no 
unit for comparison, then there is also no unit for
18
interpersonal comparisons of value, or for adding the values 
of different people.
Not only is there no unit of value, but the value at­
tached to physically identical units of means varies with 
the number of units available to us. The value of units of 
means varies with the ends which they are used to achieve. 
For example, if we have 30 gallons of water, we will use the 
first few gallons for drinking, the next few for cooking, 
the next few perhaps for our pets or for bathing, and the 
last for our landscape unless we are growing edible food, in 
which case water for our vegetable plants might be more 
highly valued than water for boiling food.
If we have a number of units which can achieve several 
different ends, then we will use the first unit or units to 
achieve our most highly (subjectively) valued end. The next 
unit or units will be used to achieve the next lower valued 
end which they can achieve. The value of the first used 
units is higher than the value of those used later. As we 
add to our stock of a good, each additional unit can be used 
to satisfy lower valued ends. Similarly, as we lose units 
of our good, each remaining unit must be used to serve more 
highly valued ends. Therefore, the value of the additional 
or marginal unit of a good varies inversely to the number of 
units of the good we possess. This is the theory of 
marginal value.
19
The theory of marginal value solves the paradox of 
value. The paradox of value is that goods less useful for 
human life, such as gold or diamonds, fetch a higher price, 
or are more highly valued, than goods absolutely essential 
for life, such as bread or water. The paradox occurs if we 
think of the entire supply of a good rather than marginal 
units of it and their relative scarcity. If we have a lot 
of gallons of water available, the marginal gallon will have 
a low value. Because diamonds are scarce, we have only 
enough of them to satisfy our highest valued end of 
aesthetic pleasure. If, however, we were faced with a very 
small stock of gallons of water, our end of life maintenance 
would rank higher than our end of aesthetic pleasure, and 
the gallons of water would be more highly valued than the 
diamond. In fact, a thirsty person in the desert might 
willingly give up a diamond in exchange for a gallon of 
water.
When we pursue one end with a unit of a good, we cannot 
pursue another end to which that unit could be put. The 
next most highly ranked end to which we could have put the 
unit which we are now using for our highest ranked end is 
the cost of our action. It is the alternative we have given 
up. If we only have enough water for drinking or for water­
ing our vegetables, and we use the water for drinking, then 
watering our vegetables is the cost of our action. It is
20
the most highly ranked alternative end which we must forgo 
because of the end we have chosen.
Prices are exchange ratios between goods. If we were 
thirsty in the desert and gave up a diamond for a gallon of 
water, the price of a gallon of water would be a diamond, 
and the price of a diamond would be a gallon of water.
Prices are simply the exchange ratios between goods. Prices 
do not measure the value of goods. Values are subjective. 
Exchanges of goods are objective, but they are a higher or­
der phenomenon which results from-the different subjective 
valuations of the individuals who make the exchange. Higher 
order phenomena emerge from more fundamental phenomena. 
Individual ranking of ends, a more fundamental event, must 
occur before that individual can decide what to give up in 
exchange to another individual. Exchange ratios, or prices, 
are thus higher order phenomena that occur when more than 
one individual acts.
For an exchange to occur, the parties to the exchange 
must have opposite valuations: one must value a gallon of 
water more highly than a diamond, and the other must value a 
diamond more highly than a gallon of water, in order for an 
exchange to take place. This is called double and reverse 
coincidence of wants. If both valued a gallon of water more 
highly than a diamond, the person who had the gallon of wa­
ter would not give it up for a diamond, and the person with 
the diamond would remain thirsty. Prices, therefore, do not
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"measure" anything objective about the value of the goods 
exchanged. The goods have unequal and oppositely ranked 
subjective value to the parties in the exchange. Prices 
merely reflect the objective fact of the exchange. Thus, if 
an exchange takes place, there has been what is called a 
"double and reverse coincidence of wants" and both parties 
to the exchange have benefitted.
Every exchange benefits both parties to the exchange. 
Both parties exchange something they value less for some­
thing they value more. If one thirsty person in a desert 
gives up a diamond for a gallon of water, this is because 
that diamond is worth less to him than the gallon of water. 
And the other person who gave up the gallon of water for a 
diamond also did so because he valued the gallon of water 
less than the diamond. Both parties get what they desire 
from the exchange.
Some exchanges take place not at the same moment but 
over time. For example, if the thirsty person obtained a
gallon of water in exchange for ten diamonds when the par- ,
ties reach his mine, an exchange through time has taken 
place. A present good, the gallon of water, has been ex­
changed for a future good, ten diamonds. The price of a 
gallon of water is either a diamond now or ten diamonds when
the parties get to the mine because aside from the risk that
the contract will not be fulfilled, we all prefer, to 
greater or lesser degree, the same amount of a good now to
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that same amount in the future. This is the phenomenon of 
time preference.
Interest is a phenomenon of time preference. Interest 
is merely the premium paid over a current exchange price in 
order to fulfill the exchange in the future. The water 
provider requires something commensurate to what he could 
have done with the diamond if he had had it during the time 
between the contracted exchange and when the other party to 
the exchange fulfills his contract. Clearly interest is not 
a function of money, because contracts for future payments 
may be in kind, as is this water for diamonds example. 
Austrian economists recognize that interest is purely a 
time-preference phenomenon, not a payment to capital paral­
lel to wage payments for labor and rent payments to land.
Capital goods are factors of production. They are 
higher order goods which are used to produce the lowest or­
der of goods, consumer goods. From the perspective of act­
ing individuals, capital goods are useful only because they 
produce goods which individuals can consume directly. 
Individuals receive no satisfaction from the existence of 
capital goods per se. Individuals do not therefore invest 
in or produce capital goods unless they expect that the in­
vestment will yield greater quantitative or qualitative sat­
isfaction than the individuals currently enjoy from the ex­
isting array of consumer goods. At any given time, we 
choose to satisfy our highest valued ends with the means at
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our disposal. If we perceive a way to use the same means to 
provide even more for ourselves at a later date than we 
could if we did not change our way of doing things, we may 
choose to invest in the new process. This investment in­
volves saving or abstaining from immediate consumption of 
some of our stock of existing consumer goods so that we can 
provide for our needs during the period of production, the 
time before the goods produced by the new, more productive 
methods are available. Capital goods are means of produc­
tion produced as a result of saving.
One feature of capital goods must be emphasized.
Capital is not merely a monetary phenomenon. Capital con­
sists in real goods that are subject to fires, rust, earth­
quakes, and other natural contingencies. Capital is not 
merely electronic registers of invested sums of money. 
Capital goods are goods that are used to produce consumer 
goods. Capital goods may fetch a certain price in the mar­
ket and that price may be used to determine whether one 
wishes to retain that capital good in the line of production 
for which it is currently being used. The price which one 
might obtain for a capital good must not be confused with 
the capital good itself. Clearly goods can be used to pro­
duce more directly consumable goods in the absence of money 
or sophisticated accounting systems. When aboriginal peo­
ples fashioned fishing nets, they invested time and energy
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in capital goods that would eventually produce edible con­
sumer goods.
Austrian economists focus on capital as real goods. 
Capital per se is a concept which can be expressed in mone­
tary terms to represent and compare the values of capital 
goods. This focus on the goods nature of capital allowed 
the Austrians to avoid facile assumptions such as Frank 
Knight's that capital is a permanent fund that renews itself 
automatically in the process of production. Friedrich Hayek 
argued against Knight's position in "The Mythology of 
Capital" (1936). In "The Maintenance of Capital" Hayek de­
tailed the difficulties of determining how to replace capi­
tal goods so that capital, or the income which one derives 
from the products it yields, remains constant (1939,83-134). 
Fritz Machlup demonstrated just how difficult it is to main­
tain capital goods in "The Consumption of Capital in 
Austria" (1935) . Capital value losses of corporations in 
Austria between 1913 and 1930 were as high as ninety percent 
and averaged sixty-one percent.
Once people have sacrificed consumption to invest in 
new, more productive techniques, they want to maintain those 
capital investments and their greater productivity. People 
need some means to determine whether they are maintaining 
capital goods. This is the role of money prices and cost 
accounting. As long as there are markets and therefore 
money prices for capital goods, owners of capital can
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determine what they could get for it if they were to sell 
it. Bids they might receive for it would indicate how other 
producers evaluate its quality or remaining years of 
productivity. This provides them with a measure of capital 
maintenance or depreciation.
To determine whether they can afford to maintain their 
capital, owners can compare the total of prices paid for 
various inputs to their line of production, with the total 
revenue received for selling the product at the market 
price. If revenue was greater than input, they made a 
profit, if not, they incurred a loss. If they did not yet 
count capital maintenance as an input expense, they can see 
that only if they make a profit can they maintain capital. 
Without prices to determine profit and loss, capital goods 
owners cannot perform the accounting necessary to determine 
whether they can maintain their capital. Mises succinctly 
describes the role of profit and loss in "Profit and Loss" 
in Planning for Freedom (1952,108-150). Capital maintenance 
is critical, because without it, investments are wasted.
The role of the capitalist-entrepreneur is to invest 
capital in lines of production that will be more profitable 
to the entrepreneur because they better satisfy the demands 
of consumers. Capitalist-entrepreneurs risk their own sav­
ings (or assume responsibility for risking the savings of 
others) as they invest capital in lines of production which
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they expect will produce higher-valued products than the 
products currently produced by the factors.
Ludwig von Mises made clear that the capitalist-en- 
trepreneur is a theoretical construct. In real life, that 
role or economic function may be split between two people or 
combined with other roles. For example, many small in­
vestors are capitalists because they own shares of stock of 
corporations. On the other hand, some entrepreneurs are 
also managers of the business in which they've invested cap­
ital. Other managers are employees of the firm in which 
they work but have made no capital investment in it.
Finally, because uncertainty pervades all our actions, we 
are all entrepreneurs or risk-takers (1966,251-253).
The capitalist-entrepreneur drives the market to sat­
isfy consumer demand. Those who fail to satisfy demand, who 
incorrectly anticipate demand, register losses in their ac­
counts . These losses serve as both feedback and control. 
They let entrepreneurs know that they are not satisfying 
consumer demand. They also prevent entrepreneurs from con­
tinuing to waste capital if they are not satisfying demand. 
The entrepreneur's capital will deteriorate to nothing if he 
ignores the feedback of his losses; thus he will be ef­
fectively prohibited from incurring additional losses.
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THE NATURAL THEORY OF PROPERTY
Capitalist-entrepreneurs must acquire the capital they 
risk. To buy the goods produced by capitalist en­
trepreneurs, consumers must have income. The natural theory 
of property developed by Hans-Hermann Hoppe demonstrates 
that private property rights underlie income and wealth.
Hoppe develops his natural theory of property through 
an analysis of argumentation. Argumentation is the type of 
human action we perform when we make claims about property 
rights. Hoppe presents his argument in chapter seven of A 
Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, in particular on pages 
132-134 (1989). Although Hoppe calls his theory a "natural" 
theory of property, he does not develop it from the tradi­
tional natural rights perspective, an analysis of the 
essence of human nature. Murray Rothbard developed the im­
plications of natural rights or natural law theory for po­
litical economy in his The Ethics of Liberty through a fa­
vorite tool of economists, Crusoe analysis (1982b,29-37). 
Thus any individual must recognize certain things about his 
nature (his consciousness, rationality, and ability to act) 
which lead to the recognition of natural rights and property 
rights. Both theories support private property rights. 
Hoppe's theory is an expansion of and logical foundation for 
what Rothbard describes as evident to individuals by the 
very fact of their action. Hoppe discusses the differences 
between his and Rothbard's ethical theories in "From the
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Economics of Laissez Faire to The Ethics of Libertarianism" 
(Block 1988,60-61,66-67). The article also contains a con­
cise presentation of Hoppe's argument for the natural theory 
of property (62-66).
According to the natural theory of property, the first 
point that must be recognized is that we have property 
rights in our own bodies. If we did not, we would be unable 
to do anything. Others would have the right to interfere 
with our bodies. Hoppe develops the point by arguing that 
no one could argue that we do not have property rights in 
our own bodies without thereby performing a self-contradic­
tory act. To argue at all implies that one does have a 
right to one's own body, to engage in argumentation. The 
first thing to which an individual has a right, therefore, 
is his or her own body.
Our bodies allow us to acquire property through home­
steading, production, and exchange. With our bodies, we can 
explore our environment. We can labor to demarcate property 
unclaimed by others and claim it for ourselves. This is 
homesteading. Hoppe's natural theory of property can be 
considered as providing a logical foundation for more 
traditional homesteading theories of property rights such as 
that of John Locke in Two Treatises of Government (1970).
We can mix our labor with land to produce goods, and we can 
exchange the goods we produce with the goods that other peo­
ple produce. Murray Rothbard has emphasized that every ex­
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change of goods is actually also an exchange of property ti­
tles to those goods. He makes this point in Man. Economy, 
and State (1970,78-80) and in The Ethics of Liberty 
(1982b,36).
A thief takes a good coercively. He does not receive 
legitimate title to it because he obtained it coercively. 
Although the thief has physical possession of the good, he 
does not have title to it because he did not obtain the good 
in a voluntary exchange. Physical violation of the property 
of others is also wrong. To argue that such violence could 
be permissible is clearly not a moral principle which can be 
universalized. If there were such a principle, then we 
could all destroy each other's property and bodies, and we 
would all be dead.
The requirement that ethical principles be applicable 
to everyone or to all cases to which they apply is well es­
tablished. Thus Kant's categorical imperative satisfies the 
principle of universalization. "Act only according to that 
maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law" (1959,39). The principle of uni­
versalization is also expressed in the familiar "Golden 
Rule," "And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye 
also to them likewise." [Luke 6:31]
We would also all be dead if we were to try to univer­
salize the principle that violations of the value of prop­
erty, and not physical violations of property alone, are
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wrong. For value is subjective, and it would be impossible 
to determine whether any contemplated action might decrease 
the value of some property in its owner's estimation. Even 
if we asked the owner, he might lie or be mistaken about 
what his future valuation would be, so this principle would 
be unworkable. To argue for property rights to values also 
presupposes the right to the physical integrity of one's 
body, so that the argumentative performance actually estab­
lishes property rights to physical things, not values.
Hoppe argues this point in "From the Economics of Laissez- 
Faire to the Ethics of Libertarianism" (1988,69-71) and in 
"The Ethical Justification of Capitalism and Why Socialism 
is Morally Indefensible," chapter 7 of his A Theory of 
Socialism and Capitalism (1989a,139-141). Hoppe argues that 
attempts to establish property rights to values would 
actually lead to an absurd and ironical result: "Thus, if 
one wanted property values to be protected, one would have 
to allow physical aggression against people." (1989a,141)
The natural theory of property leads to a system of property 
rights which guarantees the physical integrity, but not the 
value, of property, and which guarantees the right of 
defense against physical violations of property.
Because property rights derive from individuals' rights 
to their bodies and to their homesteaded, produced, and vol­
untarily exchanged goods, it is clear that legitimate owner­
ship must be a private phenomenon. Groups of individuals
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may agree to own shares of a productive enterprise, but 
property titles are still held by individuals. To attempt 
to abolish private ownership involves one in a self­
contradictory performance. If attempted in the means of 
production, abolishment of private ownership leads to chaos 
and political battles.
Chaos occurs when there are no longer prices for fac­
tors of production to help one determine whether capital is 
being maintained. Because one does not own the capital and 
has not risked one's own wealth in production, loss controls 
do not work. Chaos occurs because capital is used to pro­
duce goods which consumers desire less than other possible 
goods, yet there is no effective feedback and control to in­
dicate and correct this problem.
In Planned Chaos (reprinted as the epilogue to his 
book, Socialism], Ludwig von Mises demonstrates that planned 
economies lead to chaos and decreased wealth rather than to 
more efficient production and increased wealth as their pro­
ponents claim. Thus, chaos is not generated by free prop­
erty exchanges, but rather by attempts to plan them.
"...the methods of interventionism are doomed to failure. 
This means: the interventionist measures must needs [sic] 
result in conditions which from the point of view of their 
own advocates are more unsatisfactory than the previous 
state of affairs they were designed to alter. These poli­
cies are therefore contrary to purpose" (1981,486).
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Mises also makes clear that free-market economies are 
not without plans: individuals acting in the economy have 
their own plans of action. Therefore the choice is not 
between the chaos of an unplanned economy and the order of a 
planned economy, but between the order of an economy in 
which individuals can act according to their own plans, and 
the chaos and political conflict of an economy in which 
planners force their plans on others. "Whatever people do 
in the market economy," Mises wrote, "is the execution of 
their own plans. In this sense every human action means 
planning. What those calling themselves planners advocate 
is not the substitution of planned action for letting things 
go. It is the substitution of the planner's own plan for 
the plans of his fellow-men" (1981,493).
When there is not private ownership of the means of 
production, production decisions are made through political 
rather than economic means. Political decisions about the 
means of production lead to political conflict. Under pri­
vate ownership, individuals can attempt to satisfy them­
selves through actions they take with their own goods. Each 
owner expects to benefit from exchange. Political 
decisions, on the other hand, cannot involve mutual 
exchange. The political means of decision making can never 
be economic, because the economic means involves free will 
and uncoerced action. The political means involves coercion 
of some to the plans of others. Political decisions are
33
made about things unowned by anyone or about things owned by 
others. Political decisions always create winners and 
losers. These groups conflict over what to do with the 
means of production. Within the framework of the natural 
theory of property and Austrian economic theory, therefore, 
political economic decisions are unjustifiable and 
unworkable.
In The State. Franz Oppenheimer distinguishes between 
the only two ways in which people can acquire the goods they 
desire: "These are work and robbery, one's own labor and the 
forcible appropriation of the labor of others." Oppenheimer 
calls the former "the 'economic means' for the satisfaction 
of needs," while the latter he calls the "political means." 
(1975,12) Mises makes a similar distinction, that between 
contractual and hegemonic relationships: "Human civilization 
. . . is preponderantly a product of contractual relations." 
but "The state as an apparatus of compulsion and coercion is 
by necessity a hegemonic organization." (1966,196). Mises 
unfortunately confuses the distinction between these two re­
lationships by labeling them both "cooperation," when it 
clearly is stretching that term to apply it to situations in 
which one's only choice is to obey or die (or suffer some 
other damage).
Rothbard makes the difference between the two means of 
obtaining goods clear with his division of types of 
interpersonal action into two categories: "invasive" or
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violent, which includes assault, murder, robbery, slavery 
and war, and "noninvasive" or nonviolent, which includes 
voluntary exchange and gifts (1970,67-80). Rothbard also 
categorizes and develops the implications for wealth of 
various types of political intervention in the market. 
"Coercive intervention, . . . , signifies per se that the 
individual or individuals coerced would not have done what 
they are now doing were it not for the intervention. The 
individual who is coerced into . . . making or not making an 
exchange with the intervener or with someone else is having 
his actions changed by a threat of violence. The coerced 
individual loses in utility as a result of the intervention, 
for his action has been changed by its impact. Any 
intervention, . . , causes the subjects to lose in utility." 
(1977a,13) For the same argument made in Rothbard's concise 
and thorough development of Austrian welfare theory, see 
"Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics" 
(1977b,28-30). Hoppe calls the two types of interpersonal 
action "contractual exchange" and "aggression" (1989a,11- 
12) .
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CHAPTER III
AUSTRIAN ECONOMIC THEORY APPLIED 
TO ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS
Environmental goods are subject to the same laws of 
property and economics as are all other goods. They must be 
privately owned, privately produced, and voluntarily ex­
changed. They are subjectively valued. They compete with 
other goods in the market to satisfy consumer demand. 
Capitalist-entrepreneurs produce environmental goods when 
they expect the prices consumers will pay for the goods to 
exceed the cost of producing them.
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
The first implication of Austrian economic theory for 
environmental economics is that environmental goods must be 
privately owned. If environmental goods are not privately 
owned, there are no markets, no prices derived from exchange 
of goods, and capital and cost accounting for the production 
of environmental goods is impossible. This leads to chaotic 
production and political conflict. If the means of produc­
tion of environmental goods are not privately owned, then 
even if one recognizes that physical deterioration has oc­
curred, one cannot know what that physical deterioration
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represents. One cannot know how expensive it will be to re­
place the capital good or resource, or whether in fact one 
ought to use the good in some other line of production be­
cause this line of production does not cover the cost of re­
placement of deteriorating means of production.
If environmental goods cannot be owned by consumers, 
there cannot be effective consumer demand for them.
Consumers will not spend money to obtain them. As a result, 
there will be no prices to indicate to capitalist-en­
trepreneurs that they might be able to make a profit by pro­
viding the goods to consumers. If capitalist-entrepreneurs 
cannot expect to make a profit, then they will not supply 
environmental goods to consumers.
Thoroughgoing private ownership is necessary for the 
production of environmental goods. Consumers must be able 
to own environmental goods, and producers must be able to 
own the means to produce environmental goods.
A tragic chapter in the history of attempts to provide 
environmental goods through political means occurred in the 
early days of what later became the Sierra Club. John Muir 
and other outdoor enthusiasts wanted to preserve the lovely 
Hetch-Hetchy Valley, a smaller sister to Yosemite. Instead 
of raising the money to buy it outright, they tried to get 
political support from the public, several successive 
Secretaries of the Interior, the nation's chief forester, 
Gifford Pinchot, congressional representatives and presi-
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dents Cleveland, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson. These politi­
cal representatives and officials also listened to groups 
associated with the city of San Francisco, who had opposite 
ideas about what to do with the valley. The city won the 
twenty-three year political battle and the valley eventually 
became a reservoir.
The trustworthiness of political allies was 
spectacularly embodied in Roosevelt. Muir treated him to a 
camping trip in Hetch-Hetchy, about which Roosevelt en­
thused, "we lay in the open, the enormous cinnamon-colored 
trunks rising about us like the columns of a vaster and more 
beautiful cathedral than was ever conceived by any human ar­
chitect." But Roosevelt's later actions allowed human ar­
chitects to drown those grand living columns below 175 feet 
of dammed reservoir water. His explanation was, "It was 
just one of those cases where I was extremely doubtful but 
finally I came to the conclusion that I ought to stand by 
Garfield and Pinchot's judgment in the matter." (Fox 
1985,125,142). For more on the history of the Sierra Club 
and Yosemite, see John Muir and the Sierra Club: The Battle 
for Yosemite (Jones 1965). For more on the environmental 
movement in that era, see Hays, Conservation and the Gospel 
of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement. 1890-
1920 (1959).
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CAPITALIST-ENTREPRENEURS, INTEREST RATES, AND INVESTMENT
Consumer demand for environmental goods ultimately de­
termines whether capitalist-entrepreneurs will be successful 
or not, but the role of the capitalist-entrepreneur as a 
producer of environmental goods is crucial. Capital goods 
produce more or higher quality environmental goods that con­
sumers demand.
The environmental entrepreneur invests in capital goods 
which will produce environmental goods. He guesses that 
capital goods are undervalued in their current line of pro­
duction. He hopes to buy them at low prices now and to 
later sell finished goods to consumers at prices which will 
pay both for the factors of production and interest.
Interest must be paid back to people who relinquished their 
savings, a current good, in exchange for a future good. 
Assuming the entrepreneur correctly guessed future consumer 
demand, he will reap profits. As the market for a new envi­
ronmental good develops, however, competitors will enter and 
bid up factor prices, while at the same time the increased 
supply of the good on the market will decrease its price. 
Profits will tend to disappear as the market tends toward 
equilibrium, but given change in the world and in individual 
action, new profit-making opportunities for entrepreneurs 
will develop. What would remain even if a market were to 
reach equilibrium is a rate of interest, the premium paid 
for exchanges paid in time.
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The role of interest rates has been examined by some 
resource economists. These resource economists emphasized 
that a decision about whether to conserve or to exploit a 
natural resource takes different time periods into consider­
ation. Interest rates enter investment decisions because 
they reflect people's time preferences.
While the emphasis here is on the production of envi­
ronmental goods, earlier environmental economists analyzed 
conservation of natural resources. This difference in focus 
does not necessarily lead to a different analysis. For ex­
ample, Scott Gordon observes that "the conservation ques­
tion, when correctly conceived, becomes simply an aspect or 
application of the traditional theory of capital"
(1958,112). Anthony Scott emphasizes capital investment in 
Natural Resources; The Economics of Conservation (1973).
"The exploitation of natural resources is merely a special 
case of the using up of any productive asset; and the pro­
longation of their use is governed by the same general prin­
ciples as govern the depreciation and maintenance of ma­
chines and buildings. . . . Conservation of resources is . .
. analytically analogous to investment in capital goods;" 
(1973,vii)
Scott's definition of conservation places it in an in­
vestment context. According to Scott, "conservation . . . 
seeks to increase the potential future rates of use of one 
or more natural resources above what they would be in the
40
absence of such policy, by current investment of the social 
income" (1973,30).
Of particular interest here is Scott's examination of 
conservationist arguments that the "social" interest rate is 
different from that faced by resource owners. Scott cites 
Pigou's description of market interest rates as "irrational" 
because they give too much preference to the present, and 
too little preference to the future. Pigou wrote
The attitude towards investment of private individuals, 
and equally of their agents,-is affected by the fact 
that many persons prefer present satisfactions to fu­
ture satisfactions of equal intensity, even when the 
occurrence of the latter is certain. That preference 
is non-rational of two equal satisfactions. The nearer 
is desired more keenly beforehand simply because it is 
nearer. But, of course, being equal, the two satisfac­
tions, viewed sub-specia eternitis are equally desir­
able. An arrangement which depends on a non-rational 
preference for the present over the future inevitably 
reduces investment below what, in the interest of eco­
nomic welfare as a whole, it "ought" to be (Scott 
1973:113).
What a pity for posterity that Pigou did not pass on 
his ability to escape the temporal limitations of mortal 
life and mutate into a glorious new species, "homo atempo- 
ris!" The fact is that for the rest of humanity, time is a 
reality and the future is uncertain. Events are situated in 
space and time for us. No two events with the same spatial 
attribute can be identical if their temporal attribute is 
different.
Pigou's slip into physiological interpretations of hu­
man action may have led him astray. Psychophysiological de­
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terminations of equal satisfaction by third parties are not 
the issue. While it may be interesting to try to determine 
how psychological states of satisfaction are related to var­
ious physiological events, this is not necessary for eco­
nomic analysis. The economic issue is human action, of 
choosing now to exchange something we value less for some­
thing we value more. The good we value more now may be a 
contract to receive more goods in the future. On the other 
hand, we may now value present goods more highly than the 
obligation to repay more goods in the future. It is the 
fact that individual rates of time preference differ that 
makes market transactions through time possible at all. For 
a simple explanation and graph of how individuals1 varying 
rates of time preference give rise to a market interest 
rate, see (Rothbard 1970,350-360).
Were Pigou to succeed in shifting everyone's time pref­
erence so that we would all be willing to give up present 
goods for equal numbers of future goods, there would be no 
point in investment. The whole point of saving and invest­
ment is to increase the quantities (or quality) of future 
goods. Given scarcity, we always attempt to produce as much 
as we can the shortest way we can. If we expect a longer 
process to be more productive, we may invest in it. But we 
certainly will not invest in a more lengthy process that we 
expect to be equally or less productive.
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Pigou proceeds, in this quote from his 1937 book, 
Socialism versus Capitalism, to reveal a preference for so­
cial experimentation rather than theoretical rigor.
It may be, no doubt, that a central planning authority 
would make less provision for investment than would be 
made through the private action of individuals in a 
similarly placed capitalist society. But the Russian 
experiment suggests that it is likely to make more pro­
vision. There is certainly no ground for asserting a 
priori that in this field, socialist central planning 
will produce situations less favourable to general 
well-being than capitalism would do (Scott 1973,113).
Ludwig von Mises provided the ground for the a priori
assertion in Socialism (1981). Socialist central planning
must lead to waste and reduced standards of living because
if there is no private ownership and thus no market prices
for factors of production, there can be no profit and loss
accounting, and no way to ascertain whether capital is being
used in ways that people desire. But of course the goal of
social planners is not to give people what they desire, but
to impose the planners' desires upon the people.
The only acceptable meaning of a "social" interest rate
from the Austrian perspective is that interest rate that
arises on the free market. Ludwig von Mises defined society
as "concerted action, cooperation," and emphasized that
society has no existence other than in individual action
(1966,143). Because society is only the individuals that
act in it, nothing more, "its" interest rate must be theirs.
This is not what conservationist planners believe.
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The conservationist planning argument is that the mar­
ket interest rate is higher than the "social" interest rate. 
Stated in terms of time preference, individuals' rates of 
time preference are higher than "society's." Individuals 
want more goods now than "society" wants now. In more mod­
ern terminology, "transgenerational considerations" require 
that current generations postpone consumption and leave more 
for future generations.
What would this lead to? Every successive generation 
becomes the present generation, the one who, from the per­
spective of "society," wants too much now. Must consumption 
be postponed forever? Let us suppose that the current gen­
eration becomes convinced of the rectitude of postponement. 
How much should it postpone? What if it decides to postpone 
all consumption? Then this generation would die before it 
creates the next generation. But then the next generation 
would have no "say" in "society," so postponement for the 
sake of the next generation could not have been correct. To 
these reductions to absurdity, an advocate of a "social" 
rate could only respond that there is some practical stop­
ping point before all consumption is terminated. But only 
individuals know for themselves what that point is.
Scott faults Pigou and others for not justifying their 
claims with an ethical argument, but even though he criti­
cizes them, he grants them far too much. Because Scott does 
not use all the economic tools the Austrian analysis pro-
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vides, he is forced into resignation. "If society does 
place this duty upon itself, the economist per se cannot 
protest." (1973,118).
In addition to the protests above, one can examine what 
would happen if, as the "social" planners advocate, interest 
rates were artificially lowered below their market rates. 
This would lead directly to capital malinvestments. Where 
would the savings come from, if the market (actual) rate is 
higher than the "social" (planned) rate? If individuals are 
not to be actually coerced into giving up their goods, the 
likely means of creating a lower interest rate is through 
fractional reserve bank credit. Funds eagerly sought at the 
low rate would not represent real savings capable of being 
used to purchase goods in the future when the capital goods 
eventually produce products. The investments would have 
been malinvestments. Real capital goods would have been 
wasted. This is the essence of Austrian business cycle 
theory. This attempt to realize the "social" interest rate 
in the real economy would not lead to enhanced provision for 
future generations. It would lead directly to reduced 
welfare in the future. Scott recognizes some of these 
problems and highlights the effects of artificially low 
interest rates on natural resources and future wealth.
A reduced rate of time preference would not assure the 
conservationist of resource preservation. . . . ex­
pansion of investments at the expense of consumption 
might well result in an increased derived demand for
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natural resources, which might overwhelm the new inten­
tions of stock-resource owners to hold their stocks for 
longer periods,. . .. Further, it is necessary to con­
sider the immediate consequences of a lower rate on the 
economy (a) in being inflationary, and (b) in deranging 
the capitalistic nature of production. It seems nec­
essary, therefore, to reject the social rate of time 
preference as a rationalization for a lower rate of in­
terest. . . .  It follows . . . that the conservationist 
who urges us to "make greater provision for the future" 
is in fact urging a lesser provision for poster­
ity ( 1973 , 123) .
It is important to emphasize capital in the production 
of environmental goods because capital is the means of fur­
ther production and improvements in production to satisfy 
consumer demand. For example, backpackers may choose to 
carry light freeze-dried food on the trail to allow them to 
remain in the wilderness longer with the same amount of 
weight devoted to food. Freeze-drying technology removes 
the heavy water content of foods so that they are light on 
the trail. They can be rehydrated in camp with water found 
nearby. Of course, ascetics with discriminating palates may 
choose to accustom their stomachs to decreased food intake, 
so that they can enjoy smaller portions of real meals on the 
trail. What might be derided as an abomination by purists 
will continue to be produced for other backpackers or ca­
noeists as long as they demand it. Capitalist-entrepreneurs 
will derive income from the consumers who do purchase 
freeze-dried food.
Capital must be invested to produce environmental 
goods. At any given time, however, the stock of capital 
goods is limited. Many lines of production compete for cap-
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ital goods or for individuals' savings to purchase them. 
Several factors determine the existing array of investment 
in different lines of production.
First, individuals make subjective evaluations about 
how much to save and invest, in accordance with their vary­
ing rates of time preference. When many individuals are 
integrated into markets, the market interest rate (which 
includes risk premiums) becomes the price at which money can 
be obtained for investment. Individuals may decide to 
invest their savings in return for the additional future 
interest return. Savings are necessary for any investment 
in capital goods to take place.
Second, individuals subjectively evaluate what particu­
lar investments to make. The roles of saver and investor 
may be played by different individuals, or they may be com­
bined. Recently, mutual funds that invest only in firms 
that produce environmental goods (primarily toxic waste 
clean-up) have been offered to the public.
Part of the investment decision involves a comparison 
of alternative investment returns. This comparison is par­
ticularly important for those who currently own capital 
goods involved in the production of environmental goods. If 
owners of the means of production of environmental goods 
expect that their factors of production could earn a higher 
return in a line of production that would not produce envi­
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ronmental goods, they will be likely to sell the goods into 
that other line of production.
Scott emphasizes that investors must always be making 
choices between alternative investments: "It is, of course, 
always desirable to have more of something in the future; 
but is it worth the cost of having less of something 
else?"(1973,ix) This statement is valid for decisions about 
alternative investments, because the specific materials of 
capital goods invested in one line of production cannot be 
invested in another line. The choice is between the pattern 
of investment and consumer goods that would occur if in­
vestors did not change the pattern of investment and struc­
ture of production, and the array of goods that would result 
if investors did change it. The "less" is relative to what 
one would otherwise have. The statement does not mean that 
one gets absolutely less of the good in which one does not 
invest. Because all investments are attempts to increase 
productivity, investors are actually trying to get more of 
one thing relative to what would otherwise be produced.
This does not lead to a loss in output of competing lines of 
production, but only to a decrease relative to what they 
could produce with the additional investment.
The market interest rate acts as a rough indicator of 
what a potential investor could be earning if he were to 
liquidate his capital goods assets and invest the sum of 
money at the going interest rate. It can also be used to
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estimate the present value of future returns from the in­
vestment. Because of time preference, future returns are 
worth less than the same amount now. An investment in the 
production of environmental goods will be made if the pro­
jected returns from the investment, discounted by the in­
terest rate, are estimated to be greater than what one an­
ticipates one could obtain by investment in something else.
This statement is similar to, but not as specific as, 
those which link investment and production decisions to an 
equilibrium. Ludwig von Mises used the notion of an evenly 
rotating economy as a theoretical construct, but he empha­
sized that there was in reality no such thing as equilib­
rium. "Action is to make choices and to cope with an uncer­
tain future. But in the evenly rotating economy there is no 
choosing and the future is not uncertain as it does not dif­
fer from the present known state. Such a rigid system is 
not peopled with living men making choices and liable to er­
ror; it is a world of soulless unthinking automatons; it is 
not a human society, it is an ant hill" (1966,246-249).
Statements that imply that there is a final unchanging 
market equilibrium that can guide our investment and produc­
tion decisions are incorrect. For example, although Scott 
criticizes Marshall for his static analysis of the economy, 
and although Scott recognizes that over time production may 
change, his production rule implies that producers can sit 
somewhere outside of time and see for all time periods what
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the earnings of the investment would be, and then adjust 
production in the current period accordingly. A producer 
should be thought of, according to Scott, "as equalizing his 
marginal net revenue and his marginal user cost. When these 
two are equal in all periods, the owner will have succeeded 
in maximizing the present value of his enterprise." (1973,8) 
But for acting humans, the future is uncertain. We cannot 
know what our user cost (returns from production in some 
future period) will be; we can only guess what it might be. 
(Scott does occasionally indicate his recognition of the 
uncertainty decision-makers face with terms like "expect" 
and "attempt.")
Once an investment in capital goods that will produce 
environmental goods has been made, a decision must be made 
about the rate at which the capital good will be used. This 
has been a focus of traditional resource economists. They 
regard resources as inventories that could be used up at 
varying rates. As a resource is depleted, the market price 
of units of it increase, assuming demand remains the same. 
But as the resource is depleted, the value of the property 
where it is located decreases, since future returns from the 
resource are diminished. A resource owner will have to 
guess whether current or future demand is likely to generate 
more income. Taking copper as an example, Murray Rothbard 
has outlined how current and future income considerations 
work.
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Why is it that copper miners, once they have found and 
opened a vein of ore, do not mine all the copper imme­
diately; why, instead, do they conserve the copper 
mine, add to it, and extract the copper gradually, from 
year to year? Because the mine owners realize that, 
for example, if they triple this year's production of 
copper they may indeed triple this year's income, but 
they will also be depleting the mine, and therefore the 
future income they will be able to derive from it. . .
. Every mine owner, then, has to weigh the advantages 
of immediate income from copper production against the 
loss in the "capital value" of the mine as a whole, and 
hence against the loss in the value of his shares.- 
(1978,248)
Thus both current demand and prices for a resource, and 
expected future demand and prices-, enter into decisions 
about rate of production. The above example was for a case 
of a finite resource. By today's technology, it is not re­
newable. If copper were to become extremely scarce, and 
there were no substitute for it, this would present an op­
portunity to an entrepreneur. The capitalist-entrepreneur 
could then risk capital in recycling or reclaiming technol­
ogy, and offer to collect copper-containing products thrown 
out as waste by-products by other industrial processes or 
consumers.
Other resources are more directly renewable. Owners of 
these would be particularly concerned to maintain capital 
value. Assuming that the product continued to be in demand, 
an owner would want to continually replace the capital that 
produces it so that he could continue to generate income or 
when appropriate sell the productive capacity to someone 
else at a high price. For example, a forest would be har­
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vested at a certain rate but also replanted to generate a 
sustained yield. The forest would be the stock of the re­
source, and the number of trees that could be harvested in 
each relevant time period would be the flow that could be 
produced. Similarly, the number of people that could hike 
and camp in a forest per relevant time period would be the 
flow (number of hiker-hours per season, for example), and 
the flora and fauna that would provide the hikers a pleasant 
experience would be the stock. If many people were allowed 
to traipse about in the forest in any given time period, the 
stock's value would decrease: the yield of enjoyable hikes 
in future time periods would decrease. On the other hand, 
if very few people were allowed to hike in the current pe­
riod, many more could be allowed to hike in the future. As­
suming that hikers pay the owner to enjoy the forest, the 
revenue to the owner of the forest would thus depend on the 
rate at which it is used.
This point can be made in the language of costs. "When 
an important indivisible factor is becoming more and more 
overutilized, there is a tendency for increasing average 
costs. . . . average costs will first decline with an in­
crease in output, . . . After the technologically most ef­
ficient point is reached, however, costs will increase," 
(Rothbard 197 0,533) For example, it costs a certain amount 
to put a trail through a wilderness. As the number of hik­
ers on the trail increases, maintenance costs per hiker will
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decrease. But beyond a certain point, hiking will increase 
trail maintenance costs.
An individual may decide to completely withhold an en­
vironmental good from any production except production for 
his own enjoyment. As Murray Rothbard points out, this is 
analogous to withholding labor from work and exertion for 
personal enjoyment instead. Withholding of scenic lands 
from enjoyment by others will make those lands scarcer as 
economic goods. Assuming constant or increasing demand for 
scenic lands, their price will actually increase. So, 
rental prices for scenic lands will actually increase if 
individuals value the lands for that purpose. "In that 
case," Rothbard explains, "the land would have an increasing 
marginal disutility of visual enjoyment forgone, just as 
leisure is forgone in the process of expending labor. . . . 
Higher rental prices offered for his land will then induce 
the landowner to withhold more of it" (1970,516) Less land 
rented out to hikers at the higher rate they would be will­
ing to pay will generate the same amount of income as was 
previously obtained by renting out more land at a lower 
rate. So actually, higher demand for these types of envi­
ronmental goods contributes to their preservation.
As long as there is private ownership of environmental 
goods, capitalist-entrepreneurs will seek the profits they 
expect to receive from providing environmental goods to the 
consumers who demand them. Capitalist entrepreneurs will
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attempt to provide environmental goods as long as they ex­
pect consumers to demand the goods and to pay prices which 
will at least cover the input prices and costs of capital 
maintenance.
The capitalist-entrepreneur will evaluate returns to 
capital in various lines of production, and if he expects 
the return for provision of environmental goods to be rela­
tively greater, the investment and production will occur. 
Because the only indication to the entrepreneur that he has 
made a correct decision is a profit, and because this then 
allows him to continue in business, it is crucial that there 
be a market and money prices for both capital and environ­
mental goods. Without monetary calculation, the environ­
mental capitalist-entrepreneur can only guess whether he is 
providing the environmental goods that consumers demand.
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CHAPTER IV
AUSTRIAN ECONOMIC THEORY APPLIED 
TO WATER RESOURCES
Provision of the environmental good, clean water, re­
quires private ownership of that environmental good and the 
means to produce it. Markets and prices must exist not only 
for the consumer goods but also for the factors that produce 
it. Entrepreneurs must be able to seek profits by devising 
ways to use factors of production they estimate are cur­
rently undervalued (underpriced) by the market relative to 
what consumers will pay for clean water in the future. They 
must also suffer losses when they are mistaken about what 
consumers will demand.
WATER QUALITY
Water pollution is primarily a legal rather than an 
economic issue. In "Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollu­
tion," Murray Rothbard has provided a lucid outline of what 
coherent, workable pollution law should be. Strict lia­
bility for physical aggression upon the property of another, 
but also rational proof of pollution would be required 
(1982a).
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Provision of clean water to consumers can be compli­
cated by pollution. A pollutant, a bad, is, like a good, 
subjectively valued. A pollutant is something which we 
strive to remove. The good we strive for is the reduction 
of pollution. The definition of a pollutant is similar to 
that of a weed in gardening: a weed is any plant that grows 
someplace you would rather it did not. When the offender is
in your garden, you dig it up and dispose of it or move it.
When the offender is in your neighbor's garden, you had bet­
ter not remove his plant without his permission, because 
though ugly to you, it may be a prize-winner to him. Simi­
larly, mercury and cyanide are useful in the separation of
gold, but if they get in your duck pond, they are pollu­
tants. A pollutant is material that occurs where you would 
rather it did not. When it has migrated into your property, 
you may get rid of it. When it is on someone else's 
property, you better let it be. If as a result of someone 
else's activity, pollutant materials damage your property, 
you should be able to demand restitution and require that 
the polluters cease the pollution. Pollution problems are 
primarily problems of effective definition and enforcement 
of property rights. Water quality is primarily a legal 
question of violation of property rights.
To state that water quality is a legal issue is not to 
state that political involvement is necessary. A tradition 
of exploration of how free markets historically did and
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could again provide legal and defense services has been de­
veloping. See The Enterprise of Law (Benson 1991) and 
"Fallacies of the Public Goods Theory and the Production of 
Security," (Hoppe 1989b).
Pollution is not fundamentally an economic issue, be­
cause it involves violation of property rights rather than 
exchanges of titles to economic goods. It is particularly 
not an issue of entrepreneurship and effective use of capi­
tal to satisfy consumer demand. There are, however, three 
ways in which entrepreneurs might be involved in anti-pollu­
tion services.
Entrepreneurs might provide pollution detection and de­
fense services such as, for example, monitoring and identi­
fication technologies so that owners of water resources 
could prove that pollution had occurred and what the source 
was. Although pollution would be a crime, it would make 
sense for owners of valuable water resources to invest in 
services that would make prosecution of violators more 
likely, and violation in the first place unlikely. This is 
entirely analogous to protection against violation of other 
owned property, such as homes or cars. The technology for 
this protection in water pollution is rudimentary. The 
equivalent of fingerprint records or fences are not yet 
available.
Part of the reason for the unavailability of antipollu­
tion technologies is that pollution into common pools of air
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and water are relatively costless to the polluter.
Capitalist-entrepreneurs cannot project returns from in­
vestment in research to invent and produce antipollution 
technology when there are no likely consumers or no con­
sumers likely to pay profitable prices. If polluters do not 
expect to get caught or to pay high damages if they are 
caught, they are unlikely to pay for antipollution technol­
ogy. As Morton J. Horwitz explained, by the mid-nineteenth 
century the legal system in the United States had changed 
from strict liability for what were then called "nuisances" 
(pollution) to a system which subsidizes economic growth by 
protecting industry from liability and damages (1977).
Although "fence" technologies to prevent pollutants 
from entering the water resource in the first place are less 
well developed, entrepreneurs could supply clean-up services 
after pollution has occurred. Acidified lakes can be 
neutralized with lime. Recent advances in water clean-up 
research and technology include genetically engineered bac­
teria that can feed on oil and some that may be able to feed 
on presumed carcinogenic substances such as polychlorinated 
biphenyls (PCBs), pentachlorophenols (PCPs) and 
trichloroethylene (TCE). PCBs and PCPs are carbon ring com­
pounds with multiple chlorine atoms attached. These are in­
dustrial products: PCPs are used in wood preservatives, PCBs 
are used in electrical transformers, and TCEs are used as 
industrial solvents or washing liquids, such as for circuit
58
boards. Bacterial biochemical pathways differ from human 
biochemistry in ways that can be enhanced through genetic 
engineering. Bacteria can use substances that are toxic to 
humans as a source of energy. The process of bacterial con­
sumption breaks the compounds down into simpler molecules or 
atoms that are harmless to humans. Simple cement lime to 
precipitate PCBs may be a clean-up method that does not re­
quire genetically engineered organisms.
Protection and remediation of contaminated property is 
a service and produces a good which can be sold to con­
sumers. It is the role of the entrepreneur to attempt to 
offer these services. Environmental water entrepreneurs 
could buy polluted water at discounted prices, clean it, and 
sell it at a higher price to reap a profit. Private vendors 
of filtered water are already performing this service. This 
service is sold to those willing to purchase purer water 
than they can obtain at a lower price.
Although entrepreneurship is involved in the production 
of the environmental good, clean water, or water of a cer­
tain quality, the remaining focus here is simply on provi­
sion of the quantities of water that consumers demand.
MARKET DEMAND
Water resources must be privately owned so that prices 
can indicate what consumers demand. There is no way other 
than a market to determine this. Subjective consumer values
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change from time to time. By the law of marginal utility, 
demand must be negatively related to price. Estimation of 
the value of an additional unit of water, however, varies 
from individual to individual and from time to time. Sur­
veys and projections are of little use compared to actual 
market prices.
Some economists have exerted tremendous effort to prove 
that the demand for water is actually elastic. (Total rev­
enue from sales of water decrease as the price of water in­
creases. Price and total revenue are negatively correlated, 
so elasticities have negative values.) Diana C. Gibbons re­
viewed studies of demand for and value of water in seven 
different economic sectors: municipal, irrigation, indus­
trial, waste assimilation (pollution and water quality), 
recreational, navigation, and hydroelectric. In each of 
these sectors, water consumption is broken down into varying 
uses. For example, municipal water use can be public or 
residential, and residential water use can in turn be broken 
down into indoor and outdoor use. Price elasticities of de­
mand for municipal use averaged -0.37 in the eastern United 
States and -0.54 in the western United States. It was clear 
to Gibbons that it would not be analytically useful to av­
erage the two halves of the country, because their water 
demand and use were significantly different. Gibbons ex­
plains that "overall price elasticities vary across regions, 
with the more elastic demand in regions where outdoor use
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comprises a larger fraction of total use" (1986,10). Even 
within regions, however, elasticities vary. For example, a 
time-series study for Tucson, Arizona, conducted by Young, 
reported an elasticity of -0.62 for 1946 to 1965, and -0.41 
for 1965-1971, while a 1964 study by Gardner-Schick esti­
mated elasticity of demand for water in northern Utah at - 
0.77 (1986,10-11).
In one of the earliest studies of demand for water, 
Linaweaver, Geyer, and Wolff reported the results of a Johns 
Hopkins University survey of residential water use (1967). 
From 1961-1966, researchers collected data from sixteen wa­
ter utilities around the country. These studies report sea­
sonal variations in daily water use and weekly patterns of 
hourly water use, with peak use much greater than average 
use. Again, averages are not extremely useful analytical 
tools. The average daily use for all the study areas was 
398 gallons, but the peak daily demand in the East Bay Mu­
nicipal Utility District was 1,534 gallons. Given elastic­
ities of demand, it might be possible for water suppliers to 
charge more for water demanded during peaks than for nonpeak 
water. This would increase revenue and lower peaks. 
Lineaweaver and coauthors report a correlation coefficient 
of 0.76 for water demand with economic level of the house­
hold (estimated by average market value of homes in the 
area). Their explanation of this is that more expensive 
homes have more water-using appliances and larger lawns.
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Steve Hanke and Lennart de Mare estimated water demand 
from a study of Malmo, Sweden (1982). Their study was pro­
voked by the results of prior study of the region which re­
ported, in apparent contradiction to economic theory, a pos­
itive correlation between price of water and per capita wa­
ter production. The problem with the previous study was 
that it used water production as an estimate of water use. 
Economic theory does not rule out the existence of increased 
supply of a good with increasing price. Over time, 
producers bring more supply to market if they expect to ob­
tain a higher price. A more general problem with any study 
of demand is that demand is always shifting. Particular 
pairs of price and quantity demanded data may lie on one de­
mand curve, or on different curves. In any actual study 
which takes place over time, demand can shift, so that re­
sults can be given alternative interpretations. (For this 
problem of using empirical data as tests of economic theory, 
see Hoppe 1983.)
Hanke and coauthor allowed economic theory to inform 
their study: "Demand theory indicates that the amount of a 
commodity that consumers demand in any time period should be 
negatively correlated with its real price. Therefore, it is 
necessary to question and critique " the prior study. (Hanke 
and de Mare 1982,621) It is of methodological interest that 
Hanke!s faith in the superiority of economic theory was not 
unwavering. In a later article on water privatization,
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Hanke and coauthor J.K. Walters wrote, "it is only through 
examining the available evidence that the validity of any 
theory can be judged" (1987,106). This dual approach to the 
relative status of theory and data reveals a confusion about 
when theory should indicate that data are being incorrectly 
interpreted, and when data should be allowed to determine 
validity of theories. The Austrian approach is unequivocal: 
deductively established theory is used to inform and judge 
empirical research. Hanke followed this approach in his re­
vision of the Malmo research. "[F]or purposes of modeling 
water demands, we must employ water use data that are 
measured by metered consumption, not production. It is this 
use that individuals and firms can control directly by their 
individual water use decisions. Hence, it is this use that 
reflects the amount of water that consumers and firms demand 
at various prices" (1982,622).
Another problem with the earlier Malmo study was that 
it aggregated users of different classes. "The aggregation 
of water use classes presents a problem in demand modeling 
because different classes of water users respond to price 
changes in different ways. That is, they have different 
price elasticities for water demand. Hence, the demand 
elasticity obtained by using aggregate water use (or pro­
duction) will be nothing more than a weighted average elas­
ticity" (1982,622).
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The final problem Hanke mentioned is a general one for 
all cross-sectional demand studies. Even if one obtains a 
significant correlation for different individuals across 
space, that cannot be used to predict demand by the same in­
dividual over time.
Hanke and de Mare remedied these problems in their 
study. They used fourteen semi-annual time periods during 
which the nominal price of water changed five times and the 
real price changed in twelve of the fourteen periods. In 
their cross-sectional studies, they divided groups into 
classes by income, age of household members, and rainfall. 
They obtained water use data from meter, not production, 
records. Their pooled, time series, cross section study 
generated a price elasticity of demand for water of -0.15.
What is useful about all these studies of water demand 
is not that they establish something that economic theory 
had already proven, but that they reveal regional and sea­
sonal variations in demand which may be useful to producers 
who plan ahead for delivery of water services. These cannot 
be a substitute for a supplier to have his finger on the 
pulse of the market, however. The studies lead one to ques­
tion whether if there are regional and seasonal variations 
in demand, why not ethnic (some cultures shower a lot, oth­
ers less; some cultures fry more food, others boil more 
food), age-related (children may play outside and be fre­
quently bathed), occupation (blue collar workers may do more
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clothes washing that white-collar workers), land-owning 
(city apartment dwellers don't water lawns but suburbanites 
do), etc. Because every individual has some unique combina­
tion of these various qualities, one can conclude that the 
market, in which individuals actually act, is the best means 
to determine what has satisfied individuals. For a review 
of elasticity of water demand studies, see The Economic 
Value of Water (Gibbons 1986) .
POLITICAL CONTROL IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
When social, legal, or political institutions prevent
private ownership of water resources, usually some govern­
ment agency is given the power to decide what uses of water
or changes in its distribution of use are in "the public in­
terest." Under an Austrian analysis, because the public is 
nothing other than the individuals who comprise it and who 
reveal their preferences in their market actions, the only 
way to ascertain public interest is to allow individuals to 
act freely in the market. For an Austrian analysis of so­
cial welfare theory, see (Rothbard 1956).
Even non-Austrian water resource economists recognize 
the difficulties involved in public interest law.
Many western states explicitly include a public inter­
est or public welfare clause in their statutes refer­
ring to water right appropriations and sometimes in 
their statutes referring to water transfers. However, 
with few exceptions, the public interest is not statu­
torily defined;. . . Nevada statutes require rejection 
of transfer applications if the transfer threatens to
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prove detrimental to the public interest. What con­
stitutes the public interest is not statutorily defined 
and the public interest criterion is applied to trans­
fer applications by the State Engineer on a case-by- 
case basis." (Saliba and Bush 1987,71,72).
Saliba and Bush do not clearly recommend that the free 
market be the sole means to define what is in the "public 
interest" but rather that more specific criteria be explic­
itly written into law, so that the existing political admin­
istration of water resources is better defined and the rule 
of law is more predictable. The problem with legislative 
law is that it can become unpredictable if each new legisla­
ture can change it. Bruno Leoni explores these problems in 
Freedom and the Law (1972). From his analysis, it would be 
better to allow judges to discover law as they make their 
decisions about property rights conflicts, rather than to 
have political representatives make law that pleases their 
constituents.
Jack Hirshleifer, James C. De Haven, and Jerome W. Mil- 
liman discuss the problem of corruption of government offi­
cials in their thorough treatment of water economics (1970). 
"This problem is of some significance for water-resource 
decisions, because of the growing trend in state legislation 
toward placing all water use under the jurisdiction of a 
water commission generally given only some vague high- 
sounding phrase on the basis of which to decide who should 
be granted the use of the water resource and who should be 
refused" (84).
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Hirshleifer and his coauthors also hint that political 
control of water has been a key to solidification of power: 
"It is of some historical interest that Wittfogel's monumen­
tal study of oriental despotism assigns a crucial if not 
all-determining role to centralized control of water re­
sources in the historical formation and maintenance of that 
characteristically bureaucratic form of government" (85). 
(The work referred to is Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despo­
tism. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1957.)
Despite their survey of several public choice and other 
political arguments against government intervention in 
markets, Hirshleifer and coauthors have no overall ir­
refutable argument against such intervention: "our purpose 
is to establish somewhat convincingly that one cannot read­
ily assume that perfect or even reasonably satisfactory po­
litical processes are available to correct market imperfec­
tions. Instead, it is necessary to consider the prospects 
for useful corrective action case by case" (86).
Some economists have examined the economic consequences 
of conversion from public to private provision of water. 
Steve Hanke and Stephen Walters described some of the eco­
nomic benefits of such a conversion and explained why it 
would work. "Private enterprises should be expected to be 
more efficient than public enterprises precisely because a 
private owner stands to gain enhanced wealth from improve­
ments in efficiency, reduction in cost, and the like. To
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put it another way, a private owner stands to forgo wealth 
if improvements in efficiency, reductions in cost, and the 
like are not pursued. In essence, private owners face sig­
nificant incentives to monitor the behavior of managers and 
employees so that they will supply what consumers demand and 
do so in a cost-effective way." (1987,105)
Hanke and Walters also suggest that managers be given a 
share of profits or stock options to elicit the best perfor­
mance by managers with a minimum of monitoring by owners. 
This would be more important for a firm that contracted for 
a monopoly supply position than for a private firm in a more 
competitive market. Private firms need not always offer 
profit sharing as incentives to managers. If this is not 
enough, then the market will reflect the decreased perfor­
mance: "If the actions of incumbent managers are inappro­
priate, profits and share prices will be lower than they 
should be. This attracts corporate takeover specialists, .
. . . The threat of corporate takeovers thus helps disci­
pline incumbent managements and generates an efficient pro­
vision of goods and services" (1987,105).
Public provision of water lacks these market incentives 
for efficiency. Generally one public agency holds a 
monopoly of water provision, and there can be no takeover if 
the agency is inefficient. Hanke cites a study by W. Mark 
Crain and Asghar Zardkoohi which "established that public 
firms' low labor productivity and underutilization of
68
capital equipment led to operating costs about 25 percent 
higher than in the private companies" (1987,106).
Hanke and Walters address the question of whether water 
provision is a natural monopoly. Because costs for larger 
pipes increase proportionately less than the amount of water 
they can deliver, water supply would seem to be an industry 
of always decreasing average cost. (The cross-sectional 
area of a pipe, which determines how much water it can 
transport, is equal to pi (3.14) times the square of the 
radius, while the circumference of a pipe, which determines 
its cost, is equal to 2 times pi times the radius. Thus, if 
the radius is doubled, the circumference is doubled but the 
area increases four times, so that costs increase less 
rapidly than area.) Pipe costs are not the only costs for a 
water supply company, however. There are meters, pumps, 
research and development, advertising, billing, customer 
service, and offices. Each of these costs will have its own 
economies of scale and may not follow the decreasing average 
costs of the pipes. Even if water supply is a "natural 
monopoly," however, this does not imply that it must be a 
government operated or regulated enterprise. Regulation 
brings its own problems. Hanke cites problems of "capture" 
of regulatory agencies by the industries they are supposed 
to discipline.
Murray Rothbard has outlined the problems with tradi­
tional monopoly theory and refined and improved Austrian
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monopoly theory. In the free market, exchanges are mutually 
beneficial; exchanges expected not to be beneficial do not 
take place. Every seller charges as high a price as possi­
ble. Thus it is impossible on the free market to find a 
"monopoly" price distinguishable from a competitive price. 
Traditional monopoly theory is also based on the notion that 
in "perfect" competition, demand is perfectly elastic; that 
is, demand could be depicted by a perfectly horizontal line. 
This would mean that at the market price, there is infinite 
demand, but at a price just above or below it, there would 
be no demand. Demand arises from ranking of ends and the 
means to achieve them. It is based on the law of decreasing 
marginal utility. For every individual, as the stock of a 
homogeneous good increases, the utility of an additional 
unit of the good decreases. This means that in exchange, 
individuals will relinquish marginal units of a good for 
less than they would relinquish the previous unit. This 
principle can be depicted as a demand curve which slopes 
downward to the right: as the price of a good increases, the 
quantity demanded of it decreases. A horizontal demand 
curve would mean that marginal units of a good would be re­
linquished for the same amount as the previous unit. This 
violates the law of marginal utility. The law of marginal 
utility is the foundation of further economic constructs; 
such constructs must never violate the law of marginal util­
ity. Therefore, a horizontal demand curve is an invalid
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construct. What is left of traditional monopoly theory is 
only the old notion that a monopoly is a government-granted 
privilege of protection against competition (Rothbard 
1960,560-660).
In partial answer to the problems of government-granted 
monopolies, some economists have proposed that potential 
operators of the monopolies be required to bid competitively 
for it. Hanke cites Chadwick's suggestion of competition 
"'for the field'" (1987,108). Hanke emphasizes that the 
monopoly should be awarded to that bidder who supplies the 
good to the consumer at the lowest price and highest qual­
ity. But even this isn't good enough from an Austrian per­
spective. Why play at markets when real markets are supe­
rior? The awarder of a monopoly could not know that the 
monopoly supplier would provide goods to consumers at the 
lowest price and highest quality. There would be no effec­
tive consumer demand in this situation, because consumers 
would be prevented from withdrawing their purchases and 
turning to another supplier. Also, the supplier would not 
be subject to takeovers.
Hanke cites less serious problems of a bidding process 
itself and the details of running a monopoly firm. He sug­
gests that a "buyers' agency" could represent consumers 
(1987,109). But from an Austrian perspective there is no 
better buyers' agency than the free market. Hanke's conclu­
sion is that franchise bidding according to the above guide-
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lines constitutes privatization, and he calls firms in 
France and Spain that receive such franchise awards 
"private"(110-112). From an Austrian perspective, these are 
not private firms because they have in fact been granted 
monopolies by government.
To say that there are problems with government-granted 
monopolies of water supply is not to say that such monopo­
lies cannot supply water to consumers. Clearly this is ac­
complished. The point is that such provision cannot take 
advantage of the market. Even if a monopoly arises in a 
free market, as long as there are no obstacles to free com­
petition it is susceptible to new firms entering the market. 
Any free market monopoly would therefore be potentially open 
to future competition. A government-granted monopoly is not 
similarly unprotected from competition. As a result, 
consumers will not be supplied as well as they would be in a 
free market.
Harold Demsetz examined arguments for government regu­
lation of utilities. He found that the theory of natural 
monopoly is incoherent. From the mere fact of economics of 
scale, he points out, it does not follow that there will be 
monopoly prices, because decreasing average costs do not 
necessarily imply only one supplier. "[TJhere is no clear 
or necessary reason for production scale economies to de­
crease the number of bidders. Let prospective buyers call 
for bids to service their demands. Scale economies in ser­
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vicing their demands in no way imply that there will be one 
bidder only. . . . Economies of scale in production imply 
that the bids submitted will offer increasing quantities at 
lower per-unit costs, but production scale economies imply 
nothing obvious about how competitive these prices will be" 
(1968,57). Demsetz affirms the point that one cannot dis­
tinguish between monopoly and competitive prices: "The im­
portant point that needs stressing is that we have no theory 
that allows us to deduce from the observable degree of con­
centration in a particular market whether or not price and 
output are competitive" (59-61). Demsetz concludes that 
"the rivalry of the open market place disciplines more ef­
fectively than do the regulatory processes of the commis­
sion" (65) .
In his discussion of water markets, Rodney Smith comes 
close to the Austrian emphasis on the superiority of markets 
as providers of goods to consumers. "In short, a market can 
guide individuals to conserve and reallocate water resources 
in ways that increase the economic benefits of water 
resources to society. It also provides adequate compensa­
tion for those who relinquish water, in the sense that they 
voluntarily accept compensation in exchange for their water" 
(1988,12).
Private ownership implies the right to prosecute 
against theft and violations of property rights. It not 
only means that the owner has the right to purchase water;
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it also means that he can do whatever he wishes with the wa­
ter so long, of course, as in doing so he does not physi­
cally damage someone else's property. Once a consumer has 
purchased water, that consumer must be able to do what he 
wishes with it. If someone else forcibly intervenes with 
the consumer's use of his water, a violation of a property 
right has occurred. For example, Las Vegas residents can be 
levied fines of up to one thousand dollars for allowing 
water to run into the street. According to Jerry M. Belt, 
Jr., of the Las Vegas Valley Water District, no one has yet 
been prosecuted under the law, but warnings have been issued 
(interview, 1991) This example is complicated by the fact 
that neither the water district nor the streets are pri­
vately owned. If the street were privately owned, the 
streetowner might be able to seek damages from the person 
who ran water into the street. What is clear, however, is 
that once a purchaser of water has paid for it, it is his to 
use as he wishes. The threat of a fine is a violation of 
private property rights. For a systematic treatment of 
third-party intervention in the property rights and actions 
of others, see Power and Market (Rothbard 1977a) .
Encouragement of water conservation would not consti­
tute a violation of property rights. People who want to 
reduce their water bills are willing to pay for water-saving 
landscape consulting and installment services. Individual 
homeowners and commercial property owners also install wa­
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ter-saving appliances to save on water bills. It is impor­
tant that all these transactions remain free and uncoerced 
so that prices can indicate just what consumers value, and 
additional supply can arise to meet their demand.
Given that individuals can own water resources, that 
ownership must include the ability to freely transfer the 
property title to someone else. If this is not allowed, 
water allocations are frozen in time or slowed through a bu­
reaucratic political process. Producers cannot efficiently 
supply consumers' needs when those needs change.
A current water problem in Nevada illustrates the prob­
lems of the political as opposed to the economic means of 
acquiring goods. The Las Vegas Valley Water District has 
petitioned the state water engineer for permits to pump and 
pipe water from rural counties. The rural counties, repre­
sented by their district attorneys, oppose these water 
transfers. Thousands of protests to the proposed transfers 
have been filed with the state water engineer and hearings 
are projected to last several years. In the meantime, the 
water district has had to discontinue commitments to supply 
water to new developments, and this has repercussions on the 
building industry. This conflict has been extensively re­
ported in the Las Vegas Review Journal.
If individuals in the rural counties could privately 
own water, they could set a price below which they would not 
sell. Water suppliers in Las Vegas could set a price above
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which they would not purchase water from the rural dis­
tricts. If no agreement could be reached between buyer and 
seller, the exchange would not occur. If they agreed upon a 
price, rural counties would receive income, and Las Vegans 
would probably be encouraged to reduce water consumption 
(practice conservation) of the expensive water. Although 
costs are historical events which are paid before a product 
reaches its market (costs are paid out of advanced capital 
rather than passed on to consumers) developers would make 
smaller profits from sales of new homes and commercial cen­
ters unless they could charge higher prices to cover what 
they paid for the more expensive water. Higher prices for 
consumers and reduced profits for developers would create 
natural market limits to growth.
Exchanges of property rights to water have become a fo­
cus of water resource analysts in recent years. In his hy­
pothetical study of a generic "Arid City" and its attempts 
to acquire water, Rodney Smith emphasizes the necessity of 
water markets and contrasts them with the likely outcome of 
political acquisitions of water.
How would Arid City Municipal Water District search for 
new supplies under a water policy that severely limits 
water transfers? ACMWD would turn to the legislature, 
the regulatory commission, and the courtroom to rest 
[sic] surface or ground waters from agricultural users. 
The inevitable political controversy would require spe­
cial commissions to study the wisdom of transferring 
water . . . for use in Arid City. More effort would be 
devoted to legal reviews of proposed conservation prac­
tices and reallocations of existing supplies. Less ef­
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fort would be spent on finding ways to conserve water 
and ensure efficiency in reallocating existing supplies 
to new uses.. . . The outcomes may primarily depend on 
the exercise of political power. The presence of real 
economic losses could become a secondary issue. Under 
an administrative system water transfers would become 
unduly politicized. Given the trend toward urbaniza­
tion in western states, it takes little imagination to 
predict the likely winner of such a pitched and expen­
sive political battle (1988,74-75).
Part of the answer to efficient water provision is 
therefore to eliminate political involvement in water trans­
fers.
More should not be read into the word 'efficiency' than 
simply the structure of production and array of goods that 
arises in a free market. Water market analysts Saliba and 
Bush recognize several problems with defining efficiency in 
any other way yet like most resource economists they still 
use cost-benefit analysis to evaluate efficiency. They seem 
to be led into this by examining water transfers rather than 
exchanges of property titles to water. Murray Rothbard 
clarified Austrian theory by emphasizing that in a market 
transaction, what is actually exchanged are property titles 
to goods (1970,78). Any confusion about this point tends to 
lead to a role for intervention in mutual exchange.
Saliba and Bush slip away from a focus on acting indi­
viduals to a more mechanistic description of flow of goods 
without the involvement of human will. They characterize 
transfers as involving "trade-offs; they make some individu­
als better off and leave others worse off" (1987,13). Ac­
cording to Austrian economic theory, no exchange of goods
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will take place unless both parties expect it to be benefi­
cial. Exchangers might ex post find themselves worse-off 
but if ex ante they would have expected to be made worse- 
off, the exchange would not have occurred. An element of 
coercion must occur for individuals to transfer goods if 
they expect to be made worse-off by the transfer. This is 
the case with taxation, for example.
It is true that all actions involve trade-offs, but 
this is from the point of view of the acting individual.
The individual's opportunity cost is his next highest ranked 
alternative action which he would have pursued had he not 
decided to perform the action or engage in the exchange that 
he did in fact make. The trade-off is not between some 
individuals being worse-off and others better-off but 
between an action and its opportunity cost for each acting 
individual. Costs are not born by some while benefits are 
born by others. Each individual bears costs and benefits as 
a result of his own preferences and choices in action. 
Individuals make subjective evaluations of costs and 
benefits.
Saliba and Bush recognize that cost-benefit analysis is 
a deficient analytical tool. The more sophisticated Kaldor- 
Hicks version states that a projected change would be 
efficient if compensation to those who would bear costs 
could be made by those who would benefit yet the latter 
would still be better off than they would be without the
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change. Saliba and Bush recognize that even this formula­
tion has problems.
The Kaldor-Hicks compensation criterion has been criti­
cized widely as a basis for public policy. Resource 
policy recommendations based upon it are contingent on 
current resource allocations and tend to reinforce the 
status quo. The ethical, conceptual and practical dif­
ficulties of valuing changes in individuals' well-being 
and the problems of identifying those who would be 
beneficially or adversely affected by a water transfer 
also make implementation of efficiency criteria a com­
plex and subjective process. Nevertheless, cost bene­
fit analysis based on Kaldor-Hicks remains the standard 
economic approach to evaluating water project proposals 
and water policy alternatives (1986,14).
An Austrian would respond that because evaluations are 
subjective, they should be left to the exchangers and to the 
capitalist-entrepreneurs who risk their own wealth on faulty 
appraisals. Economists who use "the standard approach" may 
not be risking their own wealth on those formulations. They 
may receive an income whether or not the standard approach 
is successful. Therefore, they are unlikely to recognize 
when they fail, or to lose wealth as a result of the 
failure. If they do not lose wealth as a result of 
deficient tools, they are unlikely to search for better 
ones. Capitalist-entrepreneurs, on the other hand, are 
subject to market reminders of failure. In a free market, 
risk is born by the capitalist-entrepreneurs, and their 
mistakes reduce their wealth and thus their ability to con­
tinue to make further mistakes and waste resources.
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The extent of capital and water resource waste in the 
United States has recently received a thorough examination 
by Richard W. Wahl, an economist in the Office of Policy 
Analysis at the United States Department of the Interior.
In his review of Bureau of Reclamation projects, he discov­
ered that subsidies to western agriculture had been mas­
sively underestimated. According to his calculations, con­
struction cost subsidies, below-market interest rates on 
loans, extensions of loan repayment periods, loan defer­
ments, and various administrative allowances for borrowers' 
"ability to pay" increased subsidies to over ninety percent 
for some projects; subsidies of eighty-five and eighty-six 
percent were common. This information is presented in 
charts and text throughout the first part of Wahl's book 
(1989,3-124).
Of particular interest for private provision of water 
is Wahl's examination of "ability to pay." The Bureau of 
Reclamation defines this criterion as a percentage of net 
income of a typical farm that will receive water from the 
reclamation project. Net income of a typical farm, Wahl re­
ports, is estimated by "taking the expected crop revenues 
less expenses for seed, equipment, land (exclusive of water 
cost), and hired labor and an imputed cost for family farm 
labor."(1989,39) The Bureau of Reclamation defines "ability 
to pay" as seventy-five percent of net income. All the com­
pounded estimates that this definition involves might lead
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one to look for a simpler definition anchored in actual mar­
ket transactions, and this is precisely what Wahl did.
Wahl asks, "How accurate is this method in determining 
ability to pay? One way to answer this question is to exam­
ine what price irrigators actually pay for land with a fed­
eral water supply when the land is resold. The difference 
in land values with and without a federal water supply is a 
functioning market test of irrigators' actual willingness to 
pay (and ability to pay) for project water" (1989,39). Wahl 
discovered that according to this market test, "willingness 
to pay ranges from 1.5 to 51 times the repayment to the fed­
eral government." Of seven of eighteen projects evaluated, 
Wahl suggests, "On these seven projects, willingness to pay 
ranges from 1.1 to 4.6 times full cost, indicating that 
these projects might well have been viable under private de­
velopment even without the various water subsidies provided 
by the federal government" (1989,41). Thus when one exam­
ines actual human choices as they are revealed in market ac­
tions, one discovers even more scope for market provision of 
water.
Wahl makes detailed recommendations for how federal wa­
ter policy can be changed to "facilitate voluntary water 
transfers." Although transfers between users of federal wa­
ter exist, Wahl recommends that transfer law be clarified so 
that it is not subject to administrative vicissitudes. Many 
of his proposals would help to eliminate uncertainties about
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just what rights to water entitle one to do with the water. 
For example, if federal water law were to recognize current 
users of federal irrigation water as holders of property 
titles to the water, Wahl recommends that they should be 
able to sell their titles to urban customers. In many ways, 
his proposals represent a way to desocialize federal water. 
By recognizing existing users as holders of property rights, 
and allowing them to exchange those rights in markets,
Wahl's proposals would go a long way toward creating water 
markets. Although Wahl recommends a continued role for the 
federal government as a "facilitator" of transactions, he 
clearly recognizes the advantages of free markets.
The principal goal of a policy to facilitate water 
transfers is to promote efficient water use. Over 
time, the water demands in any locale change in ways 
that could not possibly have been foreseen by the orig­
inal planners of a water resource project. For exam­
ple, water demands may shift because of changes in de­
mand for certain crops, the siting of new energy fa­
cilities, or unforeseen population growth. Therefore, 
the original allocations of water probably do not re­
sult in water being used where it is most needed years 
later. Voluntary market transfers of water allow the 
water to be used where present demands are greatest. 
Adopting a policy to facilitate water transfers would 
also allow greater flexibility in meeting future needs 
(Wahl 1989,180).
For a clear example of the way in which desocialization 
of "public" assets can occur, see (Hoppe 1990).
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CHAPTER V
AUSTRIAN ECONOMIC THEORY APPLIED 
TO GROUNDWATER
Given that private water ownership and transfer of 
property titles to water should exist to efficiently provide 
water to consumers, particular features of and implications 
for groundwater must be considered.
HYDROLOGY
Groundwater occurs in subterranean lakes or streams in 
rock structures of varying porosity. Aquifers vary in size, 
depth, flow rate, flow pattern, and other hydrogeologic 
characteristics. The United States Geological Survey has 
been performing a series of studies of groundwater. General 
results are known for many regional aquifers (United States 
Geological Survey 1985). Other studies, such as those of 
pollutant travel in groundwater, are only in their first 
phase and will not generate complete detailed information 
for decades (United States Geological Survey 1986).
Some aquifers (groundwater lakes) are like vast sponges 
underground. Others are confined by nearly solid layers of 
rock so that water cannot flow out of or into them from 
other layers beneath the ground. Unconfined aquifers may be
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replenished from underground water flowing laterally or per­
colating vertically. The aguifer classification scheme is 
actually a continuum from confined to unconfined aquifers, 
with semiconfined or leaky confined aquifers between.
In some places, the normal level of groundwater (water 
table) is so high that it is right at the land surface. In 
other places, for example the side of a mountain, a layer of 
groundwater-bearing rock may be exposed so that water runs 
out of the side of the mountain as a spring. Some groundwa­
ter is under pressure so that once it is drilled into, the 
water spurts upward. These are artesian wells. For exam­
ple, in the Dakota aquifer of South Dakota, wells drilled 
beginning in 1881 delivered as much as 4,000 gallons of wa­
ter per minute without being pumped (United States Geologi­
cal Survey 1985,111). In most cases, water must be pumped 
out of aquifers against gravity.
Surface water from precipitation or return flows of 
run-off water from irrigation may replenish an aquifer. Hy- 
drologists keep track of the "water balance" in an aquifer: 
flows into the aquifer (recharge) minus flows out 
(discharge) yield the additions or depletions of the 
aquifer. Most aquifers show seasonal fluctuations in level 
or water balance, usually on the order of a few feet to tens 
of feet.
In many regions of the country, aquifers are being 
"mined": pumping out is greater than recharge. Some
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aquifers are showing net decreases in water levels of hun­
dreds of feet. In the Dakota aquifer, water levels are es­
timated to have declined 520 feet from 1888 to 1915 (United 
States Geological Survey 1985,112) Some groundwater level 
declines may be reversed if pumping rates decrease. When 
groundwater mining occurs in looser rock layers, the aquifer 
structure may collapse. The overlying land subsides and the 
capacity of the rock structure to function as a natural 
water container may be destroyed or decreased. Some 
sinkholes may be due to water mining. For example, near 
Mendota in the San Joaquin Valley in California, groundwater 
levels declined about 260 feet between 1940 and 1963. The 
level of the ground in the area subsided 29 feet from 1940 
to 1977 (United States Geological Survey 1985,107). Begin­
ning in 1968, canals brought water into the valley so that 
groundwater withdrawals could decrease. Water levels had 
risen 200 feet by 1977, but then declined 100 feet again 
during a two year drought.
Because it takes energy to pump water up and out of the 
ground against gravity, decreases in the water level in­
crease pumping costs, given constant energy prices. In 
Floyd County, Texas, wells tap the High Plains aquifer.
John Schefter reports that "between 1945 and 1984, the water 
level in an observation well in Floyd County decreased from 
60 to 245 feet below the land surface," (United States Geo­
logical Survey 1985,114). This decline nearly doubled the
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pumping cost. Subtracting out the effects of energy price 
changes and assuming a constant price level for energy, 
pumping costs due to water level declines increased 172 per­
cent from 1952 to 1981 (United States Geological Survey 
1985,115). Pumping and water level in an aquifer are there­
fore of great economic concern for water suppliers.
In aquifers located near oceans, rapid pumping of 
freshwater may draw saltwater into the aquifer (saltwater 
intrusion), destroying the aquifer as a freshwater source. 
When wells are sunk near each other, but one is deeper than 
another, rapid pumping of the lower well may suck water up 
so fast that it no longer flows near the shallower well and 
the shallower well dries up. The area around the rapidly- 
pumped well is referred to as a "cone of depression."
WATER RIGHTS
Just as it would create conflicts to grant several in­
dividuals property rights to an entire surface body of water 
because their rights would conflict, so it creates problems 
to grant more than one individual a right to all the water 
in an aquifer. Cones of depression, generally declining wa­
ter levels, salt water intrusion and land subsidence are a1! 
problems that can occur with aquifers. While one water user 
might not mind the increased pumping costs due to declining 
water levels, others might.
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The unit of a good that is owned and exchanged in the 
market must correspond to the physical extent of the good. 
For example, to allow more than one person to own a whole 
house creates conflicts. Individuals may discover ways to 
divide the physical unit into smaller units that can be ex­
changed. A homeowner may divide part of his home, add a new 
outdoor entrance to it, and lease it. Individuals might co­
operate to share one home. Still, however, title to the 
economic unit belongs to one individual (or legal equiva­
lent, a corporation, with shares of ownership).
Aquifers often underlie the property boundaries of sev­
eral surface landowners. If all surface landowners are 
given a right to the entire aquifer, their exercise of those 
rights will conflict. If one owner decides to exchange all 
the water with another party in another waterbasin (the un­
derground equivalent of a watershed), then the rights of the 
other owners are violated. Their property is stolen.
Clearly this system is unworkable.
Problems of "common pool" resources have been examined 
by economists. In what Garrett Hardin referred to as "the 
tragedy of the commons," individuals tend to exploit as much 
of a common pool resource as possible to derive income from 
it before other individuals deplete it (1968). Hardin 
claimed that individual choices in common pool situations 
are detrimental to other individuals, so that "freedom in a 
commons brings ruin to all" and therefore individual freedom
87
in those cases must be restricted (1968,1244). Hardin 
recognized that pool resources may be privatized to overcome 
depletion and conflicts. This is easier to accomplish for 
public lands with fixed boundaries than it is for a fluid 
resource like water. For air and water, Hardin recommended 
"coercive laws or taxing devices" to prevent pollution 
(1968,1245). He saw "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon 
by the majority of the people affected" as the only way out 
of the tragedy (1968,1247).
WATER LAW
Hardin's solution requires artificial coercion because 
he neglects a factual constraint of human action. Action 
takes place in time. This means that one user of a common 
pool resource got there first, someone else was second, and 
so on. A tragedy of depletion need not occur if the rights 
of those prior in time are respected. The doctrine of prior 
appropriation embodies this approach to water rights.
Murray Rothbard has recommended that the first person 
to sink a well into an underground body of water should pos­
sess title to that amount of water that he actually uses. 
"Where there are underground rivers, the first appropriator 
can own his portion of water and use it however he wishes. 
There is no reason for him to own the whole river, . . . , 
the first appropriator and later buyers own the first used 
portion of a river flow, and the next appropriator owns the
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next downstream portion used" (1956,64). Each user would 
then have a right to a certain flow from the aquifer. The 
aquifer as a whole would not be owned, but only rights to 
flows of water from it. Barring overestimations of the 
amount of water actually available in an aquifer (because 
seasonal or yearly or longer term fluctuations can occur), 
no two individuals would have rights to the same water, and 
thus their rights would not conflict.
The doctrine of prior appropriation is not the only ap­
proach to water rights that has been recognized in water 
law. An alternative approach is called riparian rights. 
Riparian water rights belong to riparian land owners along a 
stream. Any riparian land holder, whether prior in time or 
not, has a right to as much of the river flow as he desires. 
Riparian rights can apply not only to surface streams but 
also to underground water. In that case the riparian right 
holder is the owner of overlying land. Under riparian 
rights, if an upstream user takes so much water that 
downstream users have less than they desire, conflicts 
occur. For groundwater, this system is basically the En­
glish rule of absolute ownership, which allows overlying 
landowners to pump as much water as they wish, even though 
this may deplete water for other users.
This problem of conflicts between upstream and down­
stream users under a system of riparian rights led to its 
modification. Under riparian rights modified by reasonable
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use, upstream users are allowed to divert as much water as 
they need as long as they are putting it to use on the ri­
parian lands. The riparian right does not allow water 
transfers out of the watershed, because it is still linked 
to the riverside or overlying lands. Because riparian
rights are not to specific quantities of water and may be
overridden by uses deemed more reasonable, they are quite 
uncertain. They are only workable where water is relatively 
abundant.
Riparian rights originated in England and the eastern 
United States, where water is plentiful. In the western
United States, mid-nineteenth century gold rush miners de­
veloped prior appropriation law. Miners panned in streams 
and also diverted flows. To keep their production going, 
they needed secure rights to specific quantities of water, 
and this is what prior appropriation law provided. Prior 
appropriation law spread from mining to farming. It allowed 
irrigation water to be carried far from riparian lands and 
thus made agriculture in arid regions feasible. Because 
water was so scarce, prior appropriation law also carried 
use restrictions. Any unused right, though prior, would be 
lost. Prior appropriation law was developed by those who 
used the scarce resource. It was not imposed by legal au­
thorities.
This changed shortly after the gold rush. Alfred G. 
Cuzan summarizes what followed: "The history of water poli­
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cies since 1860 is one of expropriation of property rights 
by federal, state, and local governments" (1983,20). Pri­
vate water rights were converted to usufructury rights. 
Holders of these rights could use the water, but the state 
owned it. Water rights became similar to lease holds. De­
termination of beneficial use became a matter for legisla­
tive administration. Simple nonuse was no longer the only 
indication that a right was now available for someone else 
to use. Uses were ranked by class, so that municipal use 
eventually gained a higher rank over irrigation, and commer­
cial and industrial use ranked third (Hirshleifer, De Haven, 
and Milliman 1970,233). Eventually, prior appropriation in 
time was transformed into priority of status by use, admin­
istratively determined. If two applications for water use 
were made at the same time, the one intended for a higher 
ranked use was given the right. Then that right was re­
spected as prior in time to any later applications, even if 
the later applications were for higher ranked uses. In 
times of drought, however, rights may revert to higher- 
ranked uses, regardless of priority in time.
One additional type of legal arrangement for water 
rights to groundwater originated in California. This is the 
doctrine of correlative rights. It is similar to riparian 
rights with beneficial use. All overlying landowners have 
coequal rights, subject to reasonable use. Essentially, 
slices of the water pie are granted proportional to use, and
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when the whole pie shrinks, the slices shrink, but not their 
relative size. This type of rights arrangement does not 
guarantee a physical quantity of water.
Of these several different systems for dealing with wa­
ter rights, prior appropriation generates the least con­
flicts and allows the most efficient use of the resource. 
Hirshleifer, De Haven, and Milliman point out that in water 
markets, senior water rights would sell for more than junior 
rights, and "this answers the question of 'fairness1; the 
junior appropriator has paid less for his right than the se­
nior user did, the latter's price incorporating a kind of 
drought insurance premium" (1970,236). These authors favor 
solid property rights to water unqualified by judicial or 
administrative determination of beneficial use, and they 
also favor market transfers of rights.
Markets would also take care of nonuse. Rather than 
forcing loss of rights to unused water, water unused by the 
rights holder could be sold to someone else who had a use 
for it. And, as with any other valuable commodity, a water 
right holder might prefer not to sell in the expectation of 
an even higher future price. This speculation would provide 
buffers against droughts.
Each state has the right to adopt whichever type of wa­
ter law it chooses. Many western states assume control over 
state waters. The terminology varies from "property of the 
state" to "property of the people of the state" to "property
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of the public" (Hirshleifer, de Haven, and Milliman 
1970,248). Federal water law pertains primarily to water­
ways that pass through several states. Federal control over 
national waters is based on interstate commerce powers of 
Congress, because waterways were important arteries of 
commerce. The federal role has been expanded from the New- 
lands Reclamation Act of 1902 which allowed federal subsidy 
of and control over irrigation projects. Federal control of 
water was expanded to flood control and now also includes 
hydroelectric projects. Twenty-five federal agencies ad­
minister federal water. The most significant are the Bureau 
of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers, but the Soil 
Conservation Service, for example, is also involved to 
control loss of topsoil through run-off. The Bureau of 
Reclamation deals primarily with irrigation, while the Army 
Corps of Engineers also administers hydroelectric, naviga­
tion and flood control projects.
Hirshleifer, de Haven, and Milliman characterize the 
current situation in water law as practically socialized:
"It is rather important to note the relatively limited roles 
which private decision-making and the market process are 
presently permitted to play in the development and use of 
water resources. With the possible exception of nuclear en­
ergy, no other basic resource is subject to more public and 
centralized control; no other resource is less subject to 
allocation through the market-price system" (1970,223).
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These authors recommend that administrative control over 
water resource decisions be weakened because a water com­
mission "cannot have the detailed knowledge or capacity to 
integrate that knowledge possessed by the alternative allo­
cation process- decentralized decision-making co-ordinated 
through the market" (1970,254). In addition, they recommend 
that water law follow prior appropriation, that rights be 
unambiguous and certain, and that transfers of rights be al­
lowed. Cuzan's recommendation follows his demonstration 
that public planning is inferior to private planning in mar­
kets: "What is needed for the efficient allocation of water 
resources in the U.S. is not greater public planning but 
better functioning markets" (1979,325).
Although unrestricted prior appropriation is superior 
to other systems of water rights, conflicts may still arise. 
For example, one person's pumping may make another's more 
expensive. As the water level in the aquifer drops, it 
costs more to pump it up and out against gravity. One well 
can create a cone of depression around it which might cause 
nearby shallower wells to run dry. These problems could be 
overcome in a number of ways. Hirshleifer, de Haven, and 
Milliman refer to these infringements on the rights of other 
water users as "spillover costs." For an aquifer, these au­
thors suggest that water rights to pump should clearly 
specify the conditions under which the user exercises his 
right. For example, a senior holder might be given the
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right to pump water against a certain lift. When the pump­
ing of junior rights holders causes the lift to increase, 
the junior rights holders should compensate the senior 
rights holder (1970,245).
PRIVATE COOPERATION
The oil industry has had to deal with problems of mul­
tiple wells in one field. In addition to the problems of 
depression cones, if oil is pumped out too fast, secondary 
recovery of remaining oil can be prohibitively expensive or 
impossible by today's technology. Coordinated pumping of 
all wells in the field can thus increase the overall yield. 
Given this opportunity cost for a lack of cooperation, the 
industry did attempt to coordinate its pumping.
The oil industry has been exhaustively examined by 
Robert Bradley of the Institute for Energy Research in Hous­
ton, Texas. He found that state antitrust laws passed be­
ginning in the 1890's created barriers to cooperation in the 
oil industry. Later, in the mid 1940's, states relaxed an­
titrust laws for the oil and gas industry. Shortly there­
after, however, states passed laws that mandated cooperative 
operation (compulsory pooling or unitization) of oil fields.
In most states, the window of opportunity for coopera­
tion was open and shut before a breath of free market air 
could get into the industry: usually states relaxed an­
titrust law and imposed mandatory pooling or unitization in
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the same year. But a few more extensive periods of cooper­
ation occurred in some states. Over 1,000 voluntary uniti­
zation agreements occurred in Texas between 1949 and 1977.
In California between 1929 and 1971, oil producers formed 
over 100 operating units (Bradley 1990). This evidence con­
tradicts claims that because of "imperfect information" in­
formation and transaction costs are prohibitive so that 
"contractual failure" must occur (Libecap and Wiggins 1985; 
Wiggins and Libecap 1985). Thus, while there may be obsta­
cles to cooperation, they are not insurmountable. As evi­
denced by the oil and gas industry, it is clear that cooper­
ative operation of fluid underground resources can occur in 
the free market.
Terry Anderson has written extensively on water prob­
lems and has searched the past and other countries for inno­
vative free market solutions. For example, he found that in 
England and Scotland, fishermen's clubs pay dues to maintain 
privately owned trout streams. On some small streams in 
Montana, the law does not require ranch owners to allow free 
access to "public waterways;" they can collect fees from 
fisherman and afford to fence streams. Cattle cannot 
destroy the stream banks and trout habitat is preserved.
Some ranchers even convert from cattle to trout because the 
sportfishing demand is a better source of income (Anderson 
1990,144-146). "Environmental entrepreneurs in organiza­
tions such as The Nature Conservancy and Trout Unlimited
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play an important role in creating private rights and cap­
turing the benefits of environmental amenities of instream 
flows. . . . entrepreneurs in ranching and farming can ac­
complish similar results" (Anderson 1991,108). Most con­
sumers of environmental goods would probably agree that a 
cool, lush, trout stream is preferable to overgrazed range 
and muddy water holes. The free market provides this envi­
ronmental good.
AQUIFER PRIVATIZATION
Anderson's book, Water Rights. contains a proposal for 
groundwater privatization. The theoretical model, origi­
nated by Oscar Burt and developed by David Fractor in his 
dissertation, presents a stock and flow approach to water 
rights in groundwater (Anderson, Burt, and Fractor 1983; 
Fractor 1982) Property titles to stocks and flows of water 
were also proposed by Vernon L. Smith (1977).
The important parameters in an aquifer are the stock of 
groundwater, the pumping rate, and the lift. Because lift 
and stock are inversely related (as the water level de­
creases, the lift is greater), either variable can be used 
in conjunction with pumping rate to estimate the net eco­
nomic value of production in an aquifer for every set of 
other relevant parameters such as labor or capital.
For any period of time, the stock of groundwater is 
equal to net natural recharge (precipitation and surface
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flows can seep back down into the basin, or more water may 
flow in from other underground reservoirs) minus the amount 
pumped out in that year. The marginal value of a stock of 
groundwater is related to the marginal pumping rate. Assum­
ing a constant rate for a certain interval of time, for ex­
ample a year, the marginal value of groundwater stocks is 
the rate of change of the annual net economic value of pro­
duction of the aquifer with respect to the stock of ground­
water, divided by the interest rate. The mathematical model 
uses partial derivatives to express this relationship but 
for a simple grasp it is just the economic value of the 
basin at the end of the year, minus the value at the begin­
ning of the year, divided by the stock of groundwater, dis­
counted by the interest rate.
Some simplifying assumptions are made in the model but 
could be eliminated when the specific features of a basin 
are known. For example, outlying wells go dry as the water 
level decreases, and cones of depression might make some 
wells dry or inefficient. The model looked at an equilib­
rium condition in which pumping rates were constant. They 
might actually fluctuate widely depending on drought or 
flood. Returns to the aquifer from water previously pumped 
out are ignored. The uses to which the water is put can 
change with time, which would change the value of the water 
used. All of these contingencies could be managed with ex­
perience. Given the necessary data and continuous monitor­
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ing to maintain it, it is likely that owners would form a 
corporation and seek a team of hydrologists and others to 
manage the aquifer on their behalf.
Cooperative management of a basin would be only part of 
the free market provision of water. This would guarantee 
private ownership of the productive factor. There would 
also have to be a market for the productive factor. There­
fore, stock and flow rights and property titles to the water 
would have to be freely exchangeable.
Depending on how the corporation would manage the 
aquifer, decisions to ship water out of the basin might be 
made. If a potential purchaser offered more for the water 
than the water would bring in its current use, the team 
would have to balance that greater income with any likeli­
hood that return flows and thus stock levels would be perma­
nently reduced. This does not seem different from a company 
having to decide whether to sell a facility when offered a 
high price, even though because it would lose the facility 
it would have less output in the future. These are ques­
tions of technical business management and finance which are 
beyond the scope of this paper.
The likely scenario for production of water from 
aquifers is that a capitalist-entrepreneur (including many 
small shareholders) would invest in a corporation to provide 
the necessary pumping and hydrological monitoring equipment, 
local meteorological information services, and engineering
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and management services to maintain and enhance shareholder 
value.
In summary, private cooperative management of groundwa­
ter aquifers and markets for rights to that water are the 
solution to private water provision.
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